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The Myth of the Great Writ
Leah M. Litman*
Habeas corpus is known as the “Great Writ” because it supposedly protects
individual liberty against government overreach and guards against wrongful
detentions. This idea shapes habeas doctrine, federal courts theories, and
habeas-reform proposals.
It is also incomplete. While the writ has sometimes protected individual
liberty, it has also served as a vehicle for the legitimation of excesses of
governmental power. A more complete picture of the writ emerges when one
considers traditionally neglected areas of public law that are often treated as
distinct—the law of slavery and freedom, Native American affairs, and
immigration. There, habeas has empowered abusive exercises of government
authority rather than just constraining them.
Accurate histories of the writ—and accurate stories about the writ—matter.
The myth of habeas was one device that courts used to fold the writ into the legal
apparatus of American colonialism and racial subordination. Dispelling that
myth and developing a more complete picture of habeas can provide a new lens
through which to evaluate habeas-reform proposals and avoid replicating the
errors of the past. Understanding the complex and sometimes internally
contradictory functions of habeas illuminates the dynamic relationship between
judicial remedies and government power. And these usages of habeas show how
law and legal processes, including celebrated instruments such as habeas, can
and have become tools of racial subordination and colonialism.
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Introduction
Habeas corpus is known as “the ‘Great Writ’”1 because it protects
individual liberty and checks government power. This depiction of the writ

1. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976) (“It is now well established that the phrase ‘habeas corpus’
used alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the ‘Great
Writ.’” (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 95 (1807))).
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appears frequently in cases,2 in scholarship,3 and in legislative debates.4 It
also informs the law and theory of habeas and the federal courts more
generally: Doctrine maintains that habeas benefits individual liberty and
burdens the government.5 Federal courts scholarship frequently points to
habeas corpus as an example of how the federal courts protect individual
rights from government overreach (even though the courts might not
safeguard individual rights in other contexts).6 And one persistent refrain in
scholarship is the desire to eliminate existing restrictions on the availability

2. E.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (invoking “[t]he importance of the Great
Writ”); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 322 (1996) (invoking “the history of the Great Writ”);
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 352 (1994) (invoking “the great writ”); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 500 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is useful to recall the historical importance of the
Great Writ.”); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868) (extolling the writ as “the best and only
sufficient defence of personal freedom”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) (asserting that the
writ’s “history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights and personal
liberty”); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 275 (Powell, J., concurring) (“There has been a halo about the
‘Great Writ’ that no one would wish to dim.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 558 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the writ was “a means to protect against ‘the practice of arbitrary
imprisonments in all ages, the favourite and most formidable instruments of tyranny’” (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961))); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (referring to “the Great Writ”); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.
170, 210 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (invoking “the Great Writ”); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137, 148 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (invoking “proper regard for habeas corpus, ‘the great
writ of liberty’”); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 225 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“‘The
great writ of liberty’ ought not to be treated as though we were playing a game.”); Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 546 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[F]ederal judges at times have lost sight of the
true office of the great writ of habeas corpus.”).
3. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights,
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2007) (“The Great Writ of habeas corpus
is the procedural mechanism through which courts have insisted that neither the King, the President,
nor any other executive official may impose detention except as authorized by law.”); Amanda L.
Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 380 (2010) [hereinafter Tyler, Is
Suspension a Political Question?] (“[T]he Great Writ at its core is concerned with individual rights
and liberty . . . .”) .
4. Restoring Habeas Corpus: Protecting American Values and the Great Writ: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 1–2 (2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Judiciary) (maintaining that the “Great Writ is the legal process that guarantees an
opportunity to go to court and challenge the abuse of power by the Government”); id. at 22
(statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (“To be true to our Nation’s proud
traditions and principles, we must restore the writ of habeas corpus . . . .”).
5. E.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1966–67 (2020) (invoking
burdens on government from habeas proceedings); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (“[T]he
Great Writ entails significant costs.”).
6. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 2034 (situating the authors’ common law theory of habeas
within the tradition of “courts hav[ing] special responsibilities for safeguarding basic freedoms”);
Tyler, supra note 3, at 386 (“The judiciary is the sole branch constituted for the very purpose of
ensuring that individual rights are not improperly displaced by a political majority merely for the
sake of expediency . . . .”).
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of habeas corpus (at least in some subset of cases) in order to return the writ
to its true, great form.7
This common conception of habeas is incomplete. Like other elements
of the American legal system, habeas has been used to discriminate on the
bases of race and citizenship and to legitimate government power. While
habeas is sometimes a device for securing individual liberty, it has also
served as a vehicle for the racialization and subordination of disadvantaged
groups and for normalizing excesses of government power, and that is not
merely because habeas courts failed to grant relief in some cases. The more
complicated story of habeas emerges when one considers how habeas
operated in traditionally siloed areas of law, such as immigration, Native
American affairs, and the law of slavery and freedom, which also happen to
be contact points between habeas and historically subordinated groups.8
Consider these two cases:
• Ex parte Jenkins9 was the first reported federal habeas decision
that freed an individual who was acting under federal authority
from state criminal process. Specifically, a court freed a fugitiveslave catcher who took Black people and sold them into slavery.10
• In re Archy11 granted a slave owner’s habeas petition, giving the
owner custody of a slave and allowing the owner to forcibly
transport the slave to a state where slavery was legal.12
Or consider these cases, which are well-known in the areas of
immigration and Native American affairs but not studied as habeas cases:

7. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 56
(2012) (critiquing judges “cherry picking from a raft of due process standards” and “adopt[ing]
vague and unsettled procedures” when doing habeas corpus analysis); Eve Brensike Primus, A
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (“Part II attempts to recover a
lost purpose of federal habeas review by explaining that the original Reconstruction-era extension
of federal jurisdiction to review state convictions was aimed at a problem of systemic state resistance
to constitutional rights.”).
8. Cf. K-Sue Park, This Land Is Not Our Land, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1977, 1984 (2020) (book
review) (“Many widely accepted theoretical frameworks developed from established historical
narratives about America evaded the histories of conquest and slavery . . . .”); Justin Simard, Citing
Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79, 85 (2020) (explaining that slavery cases were “part of the foundation
of American jurisprudence”).
9. 13 F. Cas. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7,259).
10. Id. at 448.
11. 9 Cal. 147 (1858).
12. Id. at 161, 171.
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Chae Chan Ping v. United States13 announced the federal plenary
power doctrine that gives the federal government expansive
powers over immigration.14

•

Ex parte Crow Dog15 laid the foundation for the analogous
plenary power doctrine over Native American affairs and resulted
in the Major Crimes Act, a law that provides for federal
jurisdiction over crimes between Native persons on Native
lands.16
These four cases provide a different picture of habeas than the more
commonly known story that is associated with better-known habeas cases
such as Boumediene v. Bush,17 which held that the constitutional guarantee
of habeas corpus applies to the United States military base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba,18 or Brown v. Allen,19 which held that state court prisoners could
relitigate their convictions in federal court.20 The story that emerges from
these better known habeas cases is, unsurprisingly, the better known story of
the writ—that habeas is a great writ of liberty and an important bulwark
against government overreach.21
Getting the full story of habeas matters for several reasons.22 First, the
full story supplies a necessary corrective to the narrative that habeas is
inherently or inevitably an instrument for justice. The writ is not inherently
great or even good; even the abstract principles with which the writ is
associated may sometimes serve less salutary purposes.

13. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
14. See id. at 609 (“[Complaints about immigration policies] must be made to the political
department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject.”).
15. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
16. See id. at 571–72 (holding that the government did not have jurisdiction over a crime
committed by one Indian against another Indian on a reservation). The Major Crimes Act is codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
17. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
18. Id. at 797–98.
19. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
20. Id. at 450. Boumediene and Brown are two of the five major habeas cases excerpted in Hart
& Wechsler. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1224, 1275
(7th ed. 2015). Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), which held that the Due Process Clause
requires more than a military officer’s affidavit to detain an American citizen, is another. Id. at 538.
21. Cf. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 7 (Greenwood
Press 1980) (“Before its introduction into the American legal system, habeas corpus had been
‘esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal liberty.’ . . . In the United States, the writ
continues as the ‘symbol and guardian of individual liberty.’” (first quoting Ex Parte Yerger, 75
U.S. 85, 95 (1868); and then Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 59 (1968))).
22. Cf. Brief for Respondent at 33, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (No. 23)
(“We shall have to look at history for the essentials of the Great Writ, but not to one point in that
history for its accidents.”).
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More carefully delineating the precise content of what is good about the
writ or when the writ does good would address one way the writ was put to
less benign usages—judges invoked the myth of the great writ to assert that,
at most, habeas can do no harm. In one case, for example, a court considered
whether it could entertain a writ of habeas corpus filed by a slave owner who
argued that another individual had (wrongfully) attempted to liberate the
owner’s slaves.23 To explain why the writ could issue “at the instance of third
persons”24—there, a slave owner seeking to claim possession of his slaves—
the court offered a lengthy history extolling the importance of “the great writ
of personal liberty”: “There is no writ so important for good,” the court
wrote.25 And, the court continued, there was no risk in expanding access to
the writ since “[a]t the worst, in the hands of a corrupt or ignorant judge, it
may release some one from restraint who should justly have remained bound.
But it deprives no one of freedom.”26
This reasoning embodies the myth of the great writ. It also highlights
one of its dangers. The myth of the great writ can conceal and enable abusive
exercises of authority. A court traded in on the myth to allow a slave owner
to use the writ as a device to enforce a claim to slaves.
Second, fleshing out a more complete picture of habeas supplies a
different perspective from which to assess habeas-reform proposals. The
habeas proceedings in the case studies often purported to focus on
jurisdiction. The idea that habeas was especially concerned with jurisdiction
was how habeas courts justified their focus on race and citizenship and
incorporated race and citizenship into the habeas process. Habeas courts
insisted that race and citizenship were elements of jurisdiction, while other
preconditions for detentions were not. The concept of jurisdiction was
flexible enough to allow courts to graft race and citizenship onto the rules
about when detentions were lawful, and it was the concept of jurisdiction that
habeas courts used to give race and citizenship outsized importance in
constitutional law.
Appreciating both what jurisdiction meant and what jurisdiction was
used for raises some concerns about reform proposals that seek to recenter
the role of jurisdiction in habeas proceedings. Calls to return habeas corpus
to a review for jurisdiction gained steam after Paul Bator’s influential article
criticized the Warren Court’s expansion of the writ.27 They have continued
23. United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1855) (No.
16,726).
24. Id. at 694.
25. Id.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. See, Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 500 (1963) (criticizing the Court for “assum[ing], without
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ever since, most recently in an opinion by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch that has
shaped the scope of federal post-conviction review today.28 Both Bator and
Gorsuch argued that the core of habeas always included review for
jurisdiction and that habeas should be restructured to reflect that principle.29
The case studies, however, show how a habeas system that professed a
concern with jurisdiction encoded race and citizenship into the habeas
process and, in so doing, legitimated erroneous detentions and excesses of
government power.
This Article does not suggest that habeas, on balance, does more harm
than good. Just as the myth of the great writ is not the full story of habeas,
neither are the case studies discussed in this Article. The point is that habeas,
on balance, is not as good as conventional narratives or sanitized histories of
the writ might suggest, and that sometimes individual habeas proceedings
will bring about significant and far-reaching negative costs. Appreciating that
story supplies a needed corrective to the conventional narrative and helps to
assess habeas-reform proposals. It also provokes some thinking about when
habeas proceedings and habeas processes might bring about more systemic
harms.
The case studies show how legal instruments and legal processes are
sometimes used for unexpected or overlooked ends. Whether any particular
instrument or process does good should probably be assessed on a more retail
basis based on what the legal instrument actually does.
The case studies do not suggest that habeas uniquely furthered
colonialism and racial subordination more so than other legal processes.
Other remedies and other bases for jurisdiction were also part of the legal
regime of American colonialism. This Article focuses on how and why
habeas played a role in that system. It does so in part because a myth
surrounds habeas that does not seem to surround other remedies (like
declaratory judgments or injunctions) or other bases for jurisdiction (like
diversity jurisdiction).30 Habeas may seem different from other remedies
discussion, that it is the purpose of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to redetermine the merits
of federal constitutional questions decided in state criminal proceedings”); Ann Woolhandler,
Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 597 (1993) (“Bator expresses dissatisfaction with the
Court for not strictly limiting habeas to issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.”).
28. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 592 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus in its
earliest form was largely a remedy against confinement imposed by a court lacking
jurisdiction . . . .”). See infra notes 233–241 for a discussion of the reach of these ideas.
29. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 592 (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus in its earliest form was largely a
remedy against confinement imposed by a court lacking jurisdiction . . . .”); Bator, supra note 27,
at 475 (“It should not, after all, be forgotten that the classical function of habeas corpus was to
assure the liberty of subjects against detention by the executive or the military without any court
process at all, not to provide postconviction remedies for prisoners.”).
30. The myth of the Great Writ is one piece of the “habeas exceptionalism” that scholars have
described. E.g., Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1703, 1708, 1721
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because it appears uniquely liberty enhancing or because it implements
worthy anti-detention, pro-liberty principles. No similar mythology seems to
surround other remedies or bases for jurisdiction.
It may be that there are features of other remedies or bases for
jurisdiction that enabled those legal processes to likewise be a part of a legal
system for colonialism. Understanding which features of which remedies—
as well as which systemic forces common to all remedies—contribute to the
remedies being used as tools for excessive government power helps to puzzle
through when particular remedies should be available, when they should be
used, and how and whether they should be reformed. This project, however,
is focused on habeas—how the internal structure of habeas lent itself to the
project of colonialism and how factors external to habeas helped do the same.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
scholarship on habeas, which reflects a sense that habeas is a great writ of
liberty or that habeas would be a great writ of liberty if only it were more
widely available or restrictions on the availability of the writ were removed.
Part II complicates this story by analyzing how habeas functioned in three
areas of law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—the law of
slavery and freedom, Native American affairs, and immigration. It suggests
that there were several ways in which habeas was one component of the legal
apparatus for American colonialism and racial subordination. While Part II
shows how habeas furthered American colonialism, Part III attempts to
explain why it did so.
I.

The Myth of Habeas
The myth of habeas has its roots in historical analyses of the writ that
focus on similar time periods. These periods include preratification history,31
Marshall-era decisions,32 Civil War-era restrictions on the writ (specifically,

(2000); see also Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 261 (1988) (“[T]he
writ of habeas corpus often is described in exalted terms . . . .”).
31. Paul Halliday examined every writ of habeas corpus issued by King’s Bench in every fourth
year between 1502 and 1789. PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE
319 (2010). Amanda Tyler explored the history behind the English habeas statute, the English
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER
OF LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY 21, 25 (2017).
32. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 982–85 (1998) (explaining that Marshall’s “common law distinction
between superior and inferior courts . . . provide[d] a fundamental organizing concept for habeas
corpus law throughout the nineteenth century”); David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas
Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J.
2481, 2498–99 (1998) (“Marshall read the Suspension Clause to obligate Congress to provide
habeas corpus jurisdiction[.]”); Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA.
L. REV. 753, 768–70, 800–04 (2013) (discussing the impact of Marshall’s Watkins opinion).
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President Lincoln’s use of military commissions),33 and the Reconstruction
Congress’s expansion of the writ to state court prisoners.34 Scholars also
discuss the Warren Court’s expansion of the writ to encompass state court
prisoners.35 These accounts skim the period from the Civil War to the 1960s
on the ground that, during this time period, habeas was not a mechanism for
relitigating criminal convictions and was accordingly quite modest in scope,
particularly given the relative thinness of federal criminal law.36 More
recently, scholars have included immigration cases from the early nineteenth
century in their studies of habeas. Yet these studies often purport to answer
questions about the nature and function of the writ in immigration
proceedings specifically, rather than habeas more generally.37

33. See TYLER, supra note 31, at 159–60, 186–87 (discussing Lincoln’s use of military
commissions); Lee Kovarsky, Citizenship, National Security Detention, and the Habeas Remedy,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 867, 896–98 (2019) (“President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension was one of the
two most pivotal events in the development of American habeas law during the Civil War.”).
34. See Primus, supra note 7, at 6 (“[T]he original Reconstruction-era extension of federal
jurisdiction to review state convictions was aimed at a problem of systemic state resistance to
constitutional rights.”); Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a
Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 862–
63, 866–68 (1994) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment supplies a constitutional right to federal
habeas for state court prisoners). Amanda Tyler additionally focused on when President Roosevelt
ordered the detention of Japanese-American citizens during World War II. TYLER, supra note 31,
at 211–12, 222.
35. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 27, at 508–11 (arguing against relitigation).
36. See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1124–26 (1995) (rejecting claims that relitigation
was available in habeas proceedings before the early twentieth century).
37. David Cole analyzed mid-twentieth century “judicial review of immigration detentions” to
assess the constitutionality of several provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Cole, supra note 32, at
2483. Specifically, Cole “examine[d] . . . four Supreme Court cases” to conclude that the
constitutional requirement of habeas in immigration proceedings extended to violations of statutes
and regulations, including eligibility for discretionary relief. Id. at 2500–06 (citing four mid- to latetwentieth-century cases: Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), United States ex rel. Hintopoulous v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S.
72 (1957), and United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927)). Gerald
Neuman analyzed earlier immigration cases from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with a
similar focus on the constitutionality of the 1996 Immigration Act. Neuman, supra note 32, at 1008–
16 (analyzing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895), and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 US. 698 (1893)). Neuman
also relied on cases decided under the 1917 Immigration Act, id. at 1016, and surveyed cases
involving foreign ships and desertions, id. at 990–92; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent
in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power
Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2002) (“Gerald Neuman’s recent work on the
scope of the Constitution in the immigration and territorial expansion contexts does not focus on
inherent powers theories or consider the contribution of Indian law.”). Brandon Garrett, Richard
Fallon, and Daniel Meltzer incorporated some twentieth-century immigration law decisions to offer
more general theories of habeas that applied to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Garrett, supra
note 7, at 72 n.171 (citing twentieth-century cases and United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621,
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These analyses have generated the idea that habeas is the Great Writ
because it protects individual liberty. Scholarship suggests habeas secures
liberty in at least three ways. First, habeas provides a remedy for certain kinds
of unlawful detentions.38 Habeas corrects for unauthorized detentions when
there is no statutory authority for a detention and an officer detains someone
on a whim.39 It also corrects erroneous detentions where some law arguably
supplies a basis for detention but was incorrectly applied to a particular
individual.40 Second, habeas is supposed to supply a remedy for unjust or
invalid laws. It acts as a sword against detention laws that are too sweeping
and exceed the government’s authority,41 such as laws that authorize
detentions for invalid reasons,42 as well as laws that authorize detentions
without sufficient process.43 For example, Brandon Garrett has suggested that
626–32 (1888) for the proposition that the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 did not affect jurisdiction
of federal courts to hear habeas petitions); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1796–98 & nn.348–60,
1813–16 (citing twentieth century cases about the non-retroactivity doctrine and proposing a new
habeas review standard).
38. The categories are not perfectly distinct (if a statute was incorrectly applied to an individual,
then that particular individual’s detention is not authorized). But disaggregating them is helpful in
evaluating what the writ is good at.
39. Neuman, supra note 32, at 1022 (“The fundamental purpose of a habeas corpus guarantee
is to ensure that executive officials will not be left to determine the scope of their own authority to
arrest and detain individuals.”); Cole, supra note 32, at 2503 (Habeas “require[s] that taking an
individual into custody be subject to the rule of law” and the “judicial review of the legality of all
executive detentions.”).
40. Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1992–93 (2000) (identifying the importance of habeas in “correcting invalid
administrative interpretations of the statutory criteria”); Garrett, supra note 7, at 66 (“[J]udicial
review remained available to examine ‘the construction and validity of the statute’ and ‘whether the
person restrained is in fact an alien enemy.’” (quoting Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 &
n.17 (1948))).
41. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 2032 (explaining that habeas is the procedural
mechanism against detentions imposed unlawfully by sovereigns); id. at 2095–96, 2105–06, 2112
(describing habeas as a way to keep the government within the bounds of the law); Amanda L.
Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 953 (2012)
(“[T]he writ of habeas corpus was much more than merely a judicial remedy — it embodied and
made real a host of important rights that protected individual liberty.”); Gerald L. Neuman, The
Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 560–61
(2010) (noting support for the idea that “the Suspension Clause require[s] a remedy for certain kinds
of constitutional errors in convictions by Article III courts,” notwithstanding contrary statutes
restricting review).
42. Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American Revolution, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 635,
640 (2015) (“Significantly, the privilege associated with the English Act did not speak merely to
process: it also imposed significant constraints on what causes would be deemed legal justification
for detention in the first instance.”); id. at 697 (“[T]he protections . . . imposed an important
limitation on the Crown’s ability to hold domestic prisoners during wartime.”).
43. See Garrett, supra note 7, at 123 (“[T]he [Suspension] Clause affirmatively offers a simple
but powerful form of process . . . .”); Tyler, supra note 3, at 337 (“[T]he Great Writ offers the
judicial remedy of discharge to those deprived of their liberty without any—much less due—
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detainees could assert “a claim of innocence . . . grounded in the Suspension
Clause” that would “mandate federal habeas review” where “no prior court
adequately examined new evidence of innocence,” even where a statute
purported to restrict courts from considering evidence of innocence.44 In that
scenario, the constitutional guarantee of habeas supplies the remedy and the
sword against an unjust law containing evidentiary restrictions. Amanda
Tyler has argued that, absent suspension, habeas supplies a substantive
protection against certain detentions.45 There too, the constitutional guarantee
of habeas prohibits laws or policies that seek to authorize certain detentions.
Third, and finally, habeas protects individual liberty because it frees people
from detention, which provides a detainee with liberty.46
Scholars have tied the conclusion that habeas protects individual liberty
to more general theories about constitutional structure, particularly those
concerning judicial power, the separation of powers, and checks and
balances.47 Brandon Garrett, for example, argued that habeas courts’
examination of whether a detention is authorized by law is one way that the
separation of powers and checks and balances vindicate individual rights.48
Lucy Salyer’s examination of immigration cases at the turn of the twentieth
century led her to observe that “the doctrine of habeas corpus” was
“especially important to the success of” Chinese immigrants who filed habeas
petitions.49 For many scholars, the “structural role” of habeas50—be it

process.”); id. at 382 (“The very essence of the Great Writ . . . is to protect one from being deprived
of liberty without due process.”).
44. Garrett, supra note 7, at 123–24. But see Lee Kovarsky, Custodial and Collateral Process:
A Response to Professor Garrett, 98 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 14–19 (2013) (suggesting these
claims should be grounded elsewhere).
45. TYLER, supra note 31, at 139 (“[T]he Constitution’s habeas privilege encompasses more
than simply a promise of access to judicial review of one’s detention, and instead imposes
significant constraints on the power of the executive to detain . . . .”).
46. See Tyler, supra note 3, at 338 (describing “the Great Writ” as “the only meaningful judicial
remedy for unconstitutional deprivations of liberty”).
47. Fallon and Meltzer surmised that one core function of habeas was to keep the government
within the bounds of the law. E.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 2032, 2094–96, 2105–06
(arguing that because it is “unacceptable . . . for the government to be wholly free from restraint in
its treatment” of Guantánamo detainees, habeas corpus jurisdiction must be available); see also
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 37, at 1778–79 (“Another principle, whose focus is more structural,
demands a system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government generally within the
bounds of law.”); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 606
(2009) [hereinafter Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power] (situating “suspension [of the writ]
within our constitutional structure” and invoking “the twin principles of government accountability
and protection of individual liberty”) .
48. Garrett, supra note 7, at 59 (“[T]he government has the burden of showing that a detention
is authorized. This burden reflects a principle central to the concept of due process: deprivation of
an individual’s liberty must be in accordance with the law.”).
49. LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 69 (1995).
50. E.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 2070–71.
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preserving judicial power, the separation of powers, or checks and
balances51—is a way of protecting individual liberty and rights.52
These ideas about habeas and the separation of powers share important
connections with more general theories about the federal courts.53 Richard
Fallon and Daniel Meltzer anchored their theory of habeas in “the Legal
Process tradition,” which “emphasizes . . . the distinctive competences” of
different “governmental institutions.”54 Within that framework, they argued
that “courts have special responsibilities for safeguarding basic freedoms.”55
Amanda Tyler similarly invoked the idea that “[t]he judiciary is the sole
branch constituted for the purpose of ensuring that individual rights are not
improperly displaced” to explain the constitutional contours of habeas.56
The story about habeas that has emerged from these analyses depicts
habeas as a great writ of liberty. That story is true, at least some of the time.
But it is not the only story or the full story, as the next Part shows.
II.

Habeas Practice
This Part unpacks three areas in which habeas corpus was commonly
used in the mid- to late-nineteenth century: the law of slavery and freedom,
Native American affairs, and immigration. Although these areas are
sometimes “ignored by mainstream constitutional law scholars as latenineteenth-century anomalies of American constitutional jurisprudence,”57
habeas cases in these areas are representative of habeas in part because of the

51. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 47, at 687 (invoking the principle that “the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty” to explain constitutional rules regarding habeas).
52. Tyler, supra note 3, at 338 (describing the Great Writ as “an important judicial tool for
remedying unconstitutional deprivations of liberty”); Cole, supra note 32, at 2484 (arguing that the
structural separation-of-powers features of the Suspension Clause should be “read together” with
the due process clause); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 2111–12 (describing habeas and due
process as working in tandem). Kovarsky’s theory of habeas power is the exception. While
Kovarsky argues that habeas preserves judges’ power to establish rules for when detentions are
lawful, he does not argue that this allocation of institutional power preserves individual rights. See
Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (2013)
(“Modern habeas corpus law generally favors an idiom of individual rights, but the Great Writ’s
central feature is judicial power.” (footnote omitted)).
53. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) (“[The] root principle is that in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment . . . .”).
54. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 2034.
55. Id.
56. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, supra note 47, at 691–92; see also Tyler, Is
Suspension a Political Question?, supra note 3, at 386 (“The judiciary is the sole branch constituted
for the very purpose of ensuring that individual rights are not improperly displaced by a political
majority merely for the sake of expediency . . . .”).
57. Cleveland, supra note 37, at 12.
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numbers.58 Of the 109 habeas cases in which the Supreme Court issued
reported opinions between 1889 and 1899, twenty-two were immigration and
Native American affairs cases—just over 20% of the habeas cases.59 That
percentage is almost twice as high if you exclude state habeas cases, meaning
that Native American affairs and immigration habeas cases could be almost
half of the federal habeas cases that federal courts heard on the merits.60
These three areas of law also share another similarity that makes
investigating them together useful: The claims in the habeas petitions
frequently sounded in the register of jurisdiction and power rather than
individual rights.61 So analyzing the cases provides a window into the

58. Jared Goldstein argued that of the 124 reported federal habeas cases before the Civil War,
the largest category (twenty-three) involved military custody. See Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas
Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1181, 1193–94 (2007). Another significant category were
cases involving the law of slavery and freedom; at least thirteen cases involved the law of slavery
and freedom. See United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686, 686 (E.D. Penn.
1855) (No. 16,726) (issuing a writ in a case arising out of the law of slavery and freedom);
Richardson’s Case, 20 F. Cas. 703, 703, 705 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 11,778) (same); Ex parte
Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1316, 1318 (C.C.D.C. 1833) (No. 17,699) (same); Ex parte Robinson
(Robinson II), 20 F. Cas. 965, 969 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 11,934) (same); Ex parte Sifford, 22
F. Cas. 105, 111–12 (S.D. Ohio 1857) (No. 12,847) (same); United States ex rel. Garland v. Morris,
26 F. Cas 1318, 1319–20 (D. Wis. 1854) (No. 15,811) (same); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
506, 507–08, 525–26 (1858) (same); Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445, 448 (E.D. Pa. 1853)
(No. 7,259) (same); Ex parte Robinson (Robinson I), 20 F. Cas. 969, 970–72 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1855)
(No. 11,935) (same); Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 322–23 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307)
(describing writ issued earlier in the case); Ray v. Donnell, 20 F. Cas. 325 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849)
(No. 11,590) (same); In re Martin, 16 F. Cas. 881, 882 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1835) (No. 9,154) (same);
United States v. Copeland, 25 F. Cas. 646, 646 (C.C.D.C. 1862) (No. 14,865a) (same) (refusing to
issue writ in a case arising out of the law of slavery and freedom).
59. See Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 419 (1891) (involving an immigration
dispute); Ex parte Lau Ow Bew, 141 U.S. 583, 584 (1891) (same); Wan Shing v. United States, 140
U.S. 424, 424–25 (1891) (same); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 650 (1898) (same);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 702 (1893) (same); Lau Ow Bew v. United States,
144 U.S. 47, 48 (1892) (same); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 539 (1895) (same);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 232 (1896) (same); Hilborn v. United States, 163 U.S.
342, 343 (1896) (same); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 652 (1892) (same); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889) (same); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 123
(1897) (involving Native American affairs); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 505 (1896) (same);
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 376–77 (1896) (same); United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 50
(1894) (same); Ex parte Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 576 (1891) (same); In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 264
(1890) (same); In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 108 (1891) (same); In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 445
(1890) (same); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 243 (1894) (same); Gon-shay-ee, Petr., 130 U.S. 343,
345 (1889) (same); Ex parte Captain Jack, 130 U.S. 353, 354 (1889) (same).
60. Cf. Park, supra note 8, at 1979 (“[R]ecognizing the histories of conquest and slavery and
their erasure is critical.”).
61. See Cleveland, supra note 37, at 13–14 (arguing that immigration and Native American
affairs “share important theoretical links”).
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relationship between jurisdiction and power on one hand and liberty and
individual rights on the other.62
The cases illustrate several dualities of the writ of habeas corpus.
Although habeas can be a mechanism for protecting individual liberty, it can
also lay some foundation for expansive government powers that undermine
liberty. And although habeas can constrain the government, it can also
constitute an important component of government power and solidify
government authority at the expense of individual liberties. And in all three
areas, habeas furthered unattractive racist visions of American society and
government power.
The case studies reveal at least three different ways in which habeas
became part of the legal regime for American colonialism. First,
subpart II(A) shows that the availability of the habeas process legitimated
detention schemes whether habeas petitions were successful or not. Habeas
was a vehicle to both affirmatively authorize particular detentions and
retroactively justify existing ones. Second, subpart II(B) argues that the
habeas process relied on race and citizenship in order to establish the terms
of membership and exclusion. Because habeas proceedings focused on
whether a detention was authorized by law, habeas proceedings drew on
underlying statutes, which often incorporated racial categorizations and
citizenship determinations. Several elements of habeas, such as the concept
of jurisdiction, were sufficiently malleable to allow courts to emphasize the
importance of race and citizenship to jurisdiction. And habeas relief—when
habeas successfully freed individuals from detention—was sometimes
pernicious when a detention challenged racial hierarchies and subordination.
Third, subpart II(C) shows how the habeas process positioned courts in a
dialogue with lawmaking branches who were interested in furthering racial
subordination and colonialism but in apparently lawful ways.
These mechanisms offer a more accurate picture of the writ and its
strengths and weaknesses. As Christopher Columbus Langdell argued over a
century ago, “any one who wishes to understand . . . equity . . . must study its
weaknesses as well as its strength.”63 The case studies also provide a window
into the legal processes behind American colonialism.
A.

Legitimating Detention Schemes

One function that habeas performed was to legitimate detention
schemes. Habeas supplied affirmative authorizations for detentions;

62. See generally Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law As Paradigm Within Public Law,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2019) (arguing that jurisdiction and power better protect minority groups
than rights).
63. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING 38 n.4 (Cambridge: Charles W. Sever
& Co., 2d ed. 1883).
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generated legal justifications for the detention schemes; provided a
superficial appearance of constraint; and implemented detention schemes by
distinguishing between persons who were subject to detentions and those
who were not.
1. Affirmatively Authorizing Detentions.—While the prototypical
depiction of the writ of habeas corpus is a wrongfully imprisoned individual
who invokes a court’s help, historically, third parties could sometimes invoke
habeas as a way to claim authority over other persons. This feature of habeas
allowed the writ to legitimate one person or one group’s power over others.
Consider how habeas operated in relation to the infamous Fugitive Slave
Acts of 1793 and 1850.64 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 allowed a slave
owner or slave owner’s agent to seize an alleged fugitive and bring them
before a federal or state judge to obtain permission to send the individual into
slavery.65 In response to the Fugitive Slave Acts, several states passed
personal liberty laws, which the Court largely invalidated in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania.66 In the aftermath of Prigg, some states prohibited state
officials from participating in the process of returning fugitive slaves,67 and
Congress responded with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which increased
the number of federal officials who could issue certificates of removal.68
Prigg and the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act preserved two usages of habeas
corpus. First, people could use habeas as an affirmative way to lay claim to
individuals and subject them to slavery. Persons seeking to take individuals
and force them into slavery could elect to use writs of habeas corpus as the
means to do so instead of the processes spelled out in the Fugitive Slave Act.
Prigg described how an antislavery state like Pennsylvania provided for
using habeas as part of the process of forcing someone into slavery:
[T]he person to whom . . . labor or service is due . . . is hereby
authorized to apply to any judge . . . who, on such application,
supported by the oath or affirmation . . . shall issue his warrant . . .
authorizing and empowering said sheriff or constable, to arrest and
seize the said fugitive.69

64. Under the acts, upon “proof [of ownership] to the satisfaction” of the officer, a certificate
of removal would issue that allowed the removal of the alleged slave. Paul Finkelman, The
Kidnapping of John Davis and the Adoption of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, 56 J.S. HIST. 397,
420 (1990).
65. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 1414–15 (1793) (permitting slaveowners and their agents to seize
suspected runaways and bring them to court to be returned).
66. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
67. THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH
1780–1861, at 118, 127 (1974 Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 4th prtg. 2008) (1974).
68. Pub. L. No. 31-60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
69. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 551–52.
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The law further provided that “the said fugitive shall be brought before [the
court] by habeas corpus . . . for final hearing and adjudication.”70 Even in an
antislavery state like Pennsylvania, habeas was a way to oversee legalized
violence against Black persons.71
In some iterations, habeas proceedings themselves provided an
affirmative authorization for that legalized violence. After Prigg, for
example, Ray v. Donnell72 described how certain individuals had applied to
a district court for a writ of habeas corpus because they suspected that
Woodson Clark “had certain colored persons concealed in his house.”73 A
district court granted their habeas petition; in that case, habeas provided a
way to identify whether Black persons were fugitive slaves, in which case
they would be forced into slavery.74
A related use of habeas proceedings might be called anti-freedom
petitions: Some states allowed owners to file habeas petitions to release
slaves into an owner’s custody.75 Mississippi’s habeas corpus act specifically
designated habeas a vehicle to deliver up a slave and resolve contested legal
ownership over them.76 Even in ostensibly abolitionist states, habeas resolved
disputed claims of title to slaves as slave owners filed habeas petitions
seeking the return of their slaves.77 In one case, a Pennsylvania court denied
a slave master’s habeas petition on the ground that Pennsylvania could detain
the slave for violating state criminal law before returning the slave to the
owner.78
70. Id. at 554.
71. Cf. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 428 (2011) (summarizing
Prigg’s holding as “violence against blacks was ‘legal’ violence; ‘illegal’ violence was violence
against whites”). For a more optimistic take on state resistance to fugitive slave laws, see Daniel
Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1879 (2019).
72. 20 F. Cas. 325 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 11,590).
73. Id. at 326.
74. Id. at 326–27; see also Cross v. Black, 9 G. & J. 198, 200 (Md. 1837) (“The witness further
deposed . . . that he . . . had in his possession, a writ of habeas corpus directed to Black, commanding
him to bring the coloured persons in his custody, and whom he claimed as slaves before the judge
who issued the writ . . . .”).
75. In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 147 (1858) (releasing slave to custody of the owner); Ex parte
Toney, 11 Mo. 661, 662 (1848) (per curiam) (denying writ because prisoner was confined pursuant
to criminal conviction).
76. Miss. Comp. Stat. § 11 (1840); see DALLIN H. OAKS, HABEAS CORPUS IN THE STATES–
1776–1865, at 278 (describing Mississippi’s unique use of habeas corpus writs to recover alleged
fugitive slaves); see also Scudder v. Seals, 1 Miss. (Walker) 154, 154 (1824) (determining that
slaves were stolen from former owner and therefore belonged to former owner’s daughter); Steele
v. Shirley, 17 Miss. (9 S. & M.) 382, 382 (1848) (determining that seven slaves were stolen from
the petitioner).
77. E.g., State v. Anderson, 1 N.J.L. 36, 36 (1790) (determining whether a child born to a
woman promised freedom fifteen years after owners’ death was free); State v. Frees, 1 N.J.L. 299,
300 (1794) (holding that verbal intention to free a slave upon owner’s death is not enough for
manumission).
78. Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Holloway, 1817 WL 1762, at *1–2 (Pa. 1817).
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The precise legal theories on which these habeas petitions proceeded are
somewhat difficult to pin down. Courts generally did not spend much time
discussing whether the petitions were properly heard under courts’ habeas
jurisdiction. They seemed to assume that the petitions were within the
purview of habeas even though the typical habeas petition is filed by someone
in custody seeking their release, rather than by persons who are not in custody
and who seek to bring individuals under their custody.79 Some of the people
who filed the habeas petitions asserted that the people who were housing or
assisting (allegedly fugitive) slaves “ha[ve] no legal authority to detain said
slave[s]” and that the slaveowner was “entitled to [the slaves’] custody.”80
These claims ignore the will of the enslaved person, who could have disputed
that they were being detained if they were residing somewhere at their choice.
Yet the habeas petitions were allowed to proceed, perhaps on the theory that
a slave was akin to property whose will either did not legally exist or was
legally irrelevant, and that the slave, relegated to the status of property, was
being held by someone who lacked authority over them. Courts also may
have thought the petitions could proceed in part because writs of habeas
corpus could direct persons to be brought before a court where a court would
then make a determination about an individual’s liberty.81 Some courts
referred to writs of habeas in this way—as a device to bring persons into court
and ascertain their legal status.82
Both of these through lines appeared in United States ex rel. Wheeler v.
Williamson,83 where the parties actually did dispute whether a slaveowner
could file a writ of habeas corpus asserting a claim over persons he alleged

79. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (describing disagreement between Duker and
Jenks on relevant origins in habeas practice).
80. Archy, 9 Cal. at 161; see also Ray v. Donnell, 20 F. Cas. 325, 326 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849)
(No. 11,590) (asserting that an individual “had certain colored persons concealed in his house”).
81. Analyzing early English practice, Edward Jenks argued that “whatever may have been its
ultimate use, the writ of Habeas Corpus was originally intended not to get people out of prison, but
to put them in it.” Edward Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REV. 64, 65 (1902). To
support this claim, Jenks argued that the writ could direct sheriffs to arrest people. Id. at 68. William
Duker argued that Jenks’s historical analysis was mistaken, and that even when they did secure
custody over people, the “intended purpose” of writs of habeas “was merely to secure appearance
after more lenient methods had failed.” DUKER, supra note 21, at 22. Still, Duker explained, habeas
secured someone’s presence at court, which might result in their imprisonment, whereas writs of
capias always functioned as writs to secure arrests. See id. at 20–22. Whatever the precise contours
of early English practice, there are decisions of American courts in the nineteenth century reporting
(or at least describing) writs of habeas corpus as a mechanism to bring someone before a court, and
to determine whether they should be released to the custody of another person. And the history of
the two writs may have contributed to a belief that this usage was within the bounds of habeas.
82. See, e.g., Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 323 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307) (“[T]he
sheriff had a writ of habeas corpus, and . . . they had no other object than to ascertain whether the
negroes belonged to him.”).
83. 28 F. Cas. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 16,726).
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to be his slaves.84 The court explained that the writ required parties to respond
to a court’s inquiry—“[t]he party assailed comes before the court in
obedience to its process”; and “the first duty of a defendant, in all cases, is
obedience to the writ which calls him into court,” where the court could then
conduct an inquiry into a person’s custody or status.85
The court also suggested that a person’s status as a slave affected a
court’s habeas jurisdiction, noting that the respondent “did not question the
jurisdiction of the court: he did not assert that the negroes were free.”86 A
person’s status as free or enslaved would affect whether that person’s will
was legally relevant, and whether it even made conceptual sense to think of
someone else as having lawful control over them. So, the substantive law of
slavery helped make it possible for an owner to file a habeas petition that
asserted a claim to a slave and that maintained third parties were (wrongfully)
holding a slave within their custody or control. Wheeler’s citation of child
custody cases supports this view; the court invoked habeas cases that were
filed when someone alleged that a child was within another person’s
“possession, power or custody” or “constructive control.”87 The relevant
body of substantive law appears to have shaped which individuals might be
conceptualized as being within another person’s custody or possession and
who could file habeas petitions to ascertain where someone belonged. But
whether a person was free or enslaved—whether they could be within
another’s control—affected not only the procedural propriety of a habeas
petition but also the merits of the habeas petition. And so, courts may have
decided a person’s status in the course of inquiring into a person’s custody,
rather than doing so to determine whether a habeas petition was procedurally
proper.88
It was not just the law of slavery and freedom where habeas proceedings
allowed private citizens or public officials to lay claim over other persons.
Some habeas petitions resolved competing claims of authority over Native
persons. In In re Lelah-puc-ka-chee,89 the court addressed a habeas petition
filed by a Native woman’s husband to take custody of her and to release her
from a school.90 The habeas court ultimately concluded that the woman’s

84. Id. at 690.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Rex v. Winton (1789) 5 T.R. 89; and In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813)).
88. Id. (noting that judges often issue writs of habeas corpus when “in truth no grievance has
been sustained” because they are “not presumed to know beforehand, all the merits of the thousand
and one causes that come before [them]: [they] decides when [they have] heard”).
89. 98 F. 429 (N.D. Iowa 1899).
90. Id. at 430–31.
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alleged husband could not take her away from the school.91 Where third
parties could use habeas to assert control over Natives, habeas petitions had
the potential to enforce abusive guardianships over Native Americans and the
forced relocation of Natives to designated schools or areas.92
2. Justifying Existing Detentions.—Habeas proceedings also produced
doctrines that justified detentions, separate from whether writs purported to
supply authority for particular detentions. The doctrines produced in habeas
proceedings provided the jurisprudential architecture for the subordination of
Native Americans and immigrants.
a. Native American Affairs.—Crow Dog was one case that laid the
groundwork for the plenary power doctrine that justifies extensive federal
authority over Native American affairs.93 The case arose from Crow Dog’s
murder of another member of the Sioux Nation.94 Crow Dog was convicted
for a violation of the territorial law against murder in a district court sitting
as a territorial court, and he filed a habeas petition challenging the court’s
authority over him.95 The Court granted Crow Dog’s habeas petition,
concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Congress had
not authorized criminal jurisdiction over crimes between Native Americans
on reservations.96
Although Crow Dog’s habeas petition succeeded, the Court went out of
its way to say that with “a clear expression of the intention[,]” Congress could
enact a criminal code governing crimes between Native persons on Native
lands.97 In the closing of the opinion, the Court insisted that Natives “were
separated by race . . . from the authority and power” vested in the federal
91. Id. at 436. The court also suggested that “had she in fact been married,” she could not be
forced to stay at the school. Id. at 436–47.
92. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 227–28 (1984) (describing forced relocation of Native children to schools);
Nancy Carol Carter, Race and Power Politics As Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American
Indians: Land-Related Cases, 1887–1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197, 199–201 (1976)
(“Government attorneys . . . forcefully argued in numerous cases that the United States, acting
alone, had capacity to enter court as the Indians’ guardian.” (footnote omitted)); DAWN PETERSON,
INDIANS IN THE FAMILY: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF ANTEBELLUM EXPANSION 234–302
(2017) (describing “Choctaw Schooling” and the politics of Indian removal); U.S. COMM. ON CIV.
RTS., BROKEN PROMISES: CONTINUING FEDERAL FUNDING SHORTFALL FOR NATIVE AMERICANS,
BRIEFING REPORT 95–96 (2018) (“The policy entailed Native American children being forcibly
separated from their parents and sent far from their communities into segregated boarding
schools.”).
93. See infra note 102.
94. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
95. Id. at 557–58.
96. The Court found that a provision that excluded such crimes from federal jurisdiction had
not yet been repealed. Id. at 570–72.
97. Id. at 572.
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government.98 While the ostensible uniqueness of Native Americans
insulated them from federal oversight in Crow Dog’s case, the Court also
treated Natives’ distinctiveness as reason for extensive federal authority over
them. The Court described the dispute as whether “superiors of a different
race” could impose “the responsibilities of civil conduct” on Native
Americans in order to discipline “the strongest prejudices of their savage
nature.”99 The Court also underscored the expansive scope of the federal
government’s powers over Natives, whom the Court depicted “as wards,
subject to a guardian”:100 They were “subject[s]” “not . . . citizens” for whom
“appropriate legislation” was needed “to secure to them an orderly
government.”101
These ideas became the premises for the plenary power doctrine over
Native American affairs.102 In concluding that there was not legal
authorization for Crow Dog’s detention, the Court either nudged Congress to
authorize similar detentions or merely made an observation that Congress
could authorize such detentions, which Congress then seized on. Either way,
the ruling communicated to Congress that Congress could provide for more
detentions.103 Sarah Cleveland has described the defining features of the
resulting plenary power doctrine, including the claim of sweeping authority
that is subject to few limitations.104 The doctrine led the Court to affirm
Congress’s creation of the Dawes Commission, the infamous body that took

98. Id. at 571.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 569.
101. Id. at 568–69; see also id. at 569–70 (describing Native Americans as people “who were
to be urged, as far as it could successfully be done, into the practice of agriculture, and whose
children were to be taught the arts and industry of civilized life” and stating that they should not be
treated “as separately responsible and amenable, in all their personal and domestic relations with
each other, to the general laws of the United States, outside of those which were enacted expressly
with reference to them as members of an Indian tribe”).
102. Anthony G. Gulig & Sidney L. Harring, “An Indian Cannot Get a Morsel of Pork . . . .” A
Retrospective on Crow Dog, Lone Wolf, Blackbird, Tribal Sovereignty, Indian Land, and Writing
Indian History, 38 TULSA L. REV. 87, 89 (2002) (arguing that Crow Dog “set[] the stage for the
modern plenary power doctrine”); see also Cleveland, supra note 37, at 59 (“The Major Crimes
Act, which had been adopted in reaction to the Court’s decision in Crow Dog . . . . both regulated
crimes between Indians in Indian country and extended federal jurisdiction to crimes committed
between Indians on reservations within the states.” (footnote omitted)); Mary Kathryn Nagle,
Standing Bear v. Crook: The Case for Equality Under Waaxe’s Law, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 455,
459–60 (2012) (“[T]he plenary power doctrine has constituted the Supreme Court’s sole doctrinal
justification for its adjudications of disputes involving the balance of power between sovereign
Indian nations and the . . . federal government . . . .”).
103. For an explanation of how the focus on whether detentions were authorized by law fueled
the expansion of detention schemes, see infra notes 256–277.
104. Cleveland, supra note 37, at 42–80; see also Seth Davis, American Colonialism and
Constitutional Redemption, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1751, 1779–85 (2017) (describing the plenary
power doctrine as a tool the U.S. government invoked to deny Native sovereignty and property
rights).
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land from Native American tribes through a process of cession or allotment
(and sometimes fraud).105 A Senate Report by the Dawes Commission
invoked the reasoning from Crow Dog to justify subjecting the Cherokee
Nation to the Dawes Act (the Cherokee Nation was originally exempt from
the Act). The report referred to the “non-American” “deplorable state of
affairs” in the Cherokee Nation, which left the United States “no alternative”
but to fulfill its “constitutional obligation[]” over land and people “within its
jurisdiction.”106 Congress responded by substantially limiting the authority of
the Cherokee Nation and the other “Five Civilized Tribes.”107 In subsequent
habeas cases, the Court described “all the advantages which may accrue”
from “subjecting the Indians . . . to the same laws which govern the whites”
and “transfer[ring] [them] . . . from the jurisdiction of [their] own tribe[s].”108
The plenary power principle also served as a justification for trimming
Natives’ legal remedies against the federal government when the federal
government allegedly took tribal lands in violation of treaties,109 and, more
recently, when limiting tribes’ ability to prosecute nontribal members for
crimes committed against tribal members.110
b. Immigration.—Habeas cases in immigration also generated the nowinfamous plenary power doctrine in immigration that justifies the

105. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 645–46; see also Winton v. Amos, 255
U.S. 373, 374 (1921) (upholding Dawes Commission as amended).
106. S. REP. No. 53-377, at 12 (1894), quoted in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445,
451–53 (1899).
107. See, e.g., Appropriations Act of 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 339 (1896) (enabling a
commission to “negotiate with the Five Civilized Tribes” and “continue the exercise of the authority
already conferred upon them by law”); Appropriations Act of 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 84 (1897)
(granting a continuance of the same authority); Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, §§ 11, 26, 28, 30 Stat.
495, 497–98, 504–05 (1898) (establishing the Dawes Commission’s ability to allot land, denying
the enforcement of Native law in United States courts, and abolishing tribal courts).
108. Gon-shay-ee, Petr., 130 U.S. 343, 353 (1889).
109. See Lone Wolf v. Hithcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (discussing that for a hundred years
“[w]hen . . . treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians[,] it was
never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress.” (citing United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886))); see also Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf or How to Take Property
by Calling It a “Mere Change in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 39 (2002)
(describing the case as having “legitimated . . . what is probably the most massive uncompensated
taking of property in United States history”). For modern uses, see United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 175 (2011) (“[T]he organization and management of the trust is a sovereign
function subject to the plenary authority of Congress” and “‘[p]lenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning . . . .’” (citing and
quoting Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565)).
110. Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978) (citing Kagama, 118 U.S. at
379 to raise concerns about tribes’ judicial systems), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 4, 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101–511, § 8077(b), (c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
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subordination and control of immigrant communities.111 In one case, Chae
Chan Ping, a Chinese-American laborer was detained upon returning to the
United States after visiting China.112 In another case, Fong Yue Ting,113
Chinese-American laborers residing in the United States were arrested for
failing to obtain the required documentation allowing them to stay in the
United States.114 Although the registration and deportation scheme in Fong
Yue Ting was never fully implemented or enforced, the Court upheld it
anyway.115
In both cases, the Court reasoned in capacious terms about the
government’s authority over noncitizens, again in racialized terms.116 The
Court in Chae Chan Ping proclaimed that “we are but one people, one nation”
and that “[t]o preserve its independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation.”117 The
Court continued that “such aggression and encroachment” could come “from
vast hordes of [a foreign nation’s] people crowding in upon us” or “the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not
assimilate with us.”118 And the Court in Fong Yue Ting insisted that whether
the Chinese stayed “for a shorter or longer time,” “they continue to be
aliens.”119
Based in part on this idea, habeas courts reasoned that the federal
government also possessed plenary control over noncitizens who were
physically present in the United States, a concept that became known as the
“entry fiction.”120 This idea reinforced expansive government authority over
111. See SALYER, supra note 49, at 29 (“[T]he Court’s deference to immigration officers in
Nishimura Ekiu, as well as in Chae Chan Ping, established the basic relationship between judges
and administrators which has long distinguished immigration law from other branches of
administrative law.”).
112. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889).
113. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
114. Id. at 699.
115. BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE
MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA 24 (2018).
116. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 605–07 (“If . . . the government of the United States . . .
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country . . . to be dangerous to its
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed . . . .”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729–30
(upholding a statute requiring testimony from a white witness in the absence of a certificate of
residence for a noncitizen).
117. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
118. Id. In Fong Yue Ting, after quoting this passage from Chae Chan Ping, the Court asserted
that “[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners[] who have not been naturalized, or taken
any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.” 149 U.S. at 707.
119. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724.
120. See César Cauauhtémoc Garcia Hernández, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in
Immigration Detention, 57 HOW. L.J. 869, 872 (2014) (describing the entry fiction’s “in-between
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noncitizens in the United States,121 and allowed the federal government to
separate immigrant families at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Although the federal government had allowed children to live with their
parents for several years while deportation proceedings were not practicable,
the government insisted that the children had not truly entered the United
States and thus could be deported and separated from their families.122
Here too, the doctrines born in the habeas cases have taken on much
broader significance.123 The ideas about governmental power at the heart of
the early immigration habeas cases were trotted out in service of recent
decisions that allowed the government to exclude spouses of American

state” where “immigration detainees . . . are inside the United States[] but in substantial part beyond
the reach of its constitutional guarantees of due process”). The narrowest interpretation of the entry
fiction is that persons stopped at the border have not truly entered the United States even though
ports of entry may be physically in the United States. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (“[H]arborage at Ellis Island is not an entry into the United
States.”). The broader interpretation is that persons who physically entered the United States but
were not lawfully admitted have not truly entered the United States and crossed the border, and
therefore cannot avail themselves of the full panoply of constitutional protections. For a modern
application, see Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982–83
(2020) (applying the entry fiction to noncitizens “detained shortly after unlawful entry”).
121. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 610 (emphasizing “the favor and consent of the
government”). As Elizabeth Cohen demonstrated, this authority often spilled over to citizens as
well. See generally ELIZABETH F. COHEN, ILLEGAL: HOW AMERICA’S LAWLESS IMMIGRATION
REGIME THREATENS US ALL (2020) (discussing the impact of immigration enforcement on
citizens).
122. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 229–31 (1925) (deporting daughter who stayed
with her father for six years in the United States). Another form of family separations were children
and spouses excluded at the border. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 547 (1950) (excluding spouse); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 476 (1912) (same);
Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443, 444–46 (1924) (same); Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168,
169, 177 (1902) (excluding wife and daughter); In re Day, 27 F. 678, 679, 682 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886)
(excluding children).
123. See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power,
in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 7 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (“Congressional
power to determine who may come and stay, and who may not, is virtually unrestricted.”); see also
LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 193 (“[T]he power the federal government marshaled to exclude
the Chinese in 1888 would soon be used to sift, select, or bar all aliens at America’s gates.”).
Scholars have documented how plenary power has influenced the Court’s cases in different ways.
See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Constitutional Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548–49 (1990)
(assessing what remains of the plenary power doctrine following a statutory interpretation trend
undermining the doctrine). For other examples, see generally Nina Pillard, Comment, Plenary
Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835
(2002) (discussing whether the plenary power doctrine today is covert rather than eroded); Adam
B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373 (2004) (providing a
citizen-centered analysis of the plenary power doctrine); Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The
Law of “Domestic” and “International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333 (2019) (discussing
enforcement and punitive discrepancies between domestic and international terrorism).
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citizens with little to no explanation,124 as well as decisions allowing the
government to summarily deport noncitizens raising asylum claims.125 They
also formed the basis of the decision upholding President Trump’s ban on
entry into the United States by nationals of several Muslim-majority
countries.126
3. Providing the Appearance of Constraint.—Habeas proceedings also
helped to reinforce and legitimate federal authority by offering a superficial
appearance of constraint. For example, some habeas cases tweaked the
contours of federal authority over Native Americans without meaningfully
constraining it. In Ex parte Bi-a-lil-le,127 a habeas court rejected the Secretary
of War and Secretary of the Interior’s detention of several Navajo members
at a military fort for “threaten[ing] serious trouble upon the Navajo
reservation.”128 The court rejected the government’s suggestion that the
Navajos could be held as prisoners of war under the federal government’s
war powers;129 instead, the court reasoned, the federal government’s
authority came from its plenary authority over Native American affairs, not
wartime exigencies.130
Habeas proceedings also offered a thin veneer of constraint in the area
of immigration.131 Habeas courts identified fixable errors in detention
systems, which ostensibly required the schemes to conform to the law but did
not meaningfully constrain the government’s power over immigration. In one
set of cases, the Court struck down state inspection and detention schemes

124. Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015) (plurality opinion) cited Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798
(1977) as reason for additional judicial deference. 576 U.S. at 97. Fiallo in turn cited Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) to support the same proposition. 430 U.S. at 792. See
also id. (“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from
judicial control.’” (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (citing, among others,
Chae Chan Ping))).
125. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2020) (citing Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)).
126. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (citing Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792).
127. 100 P. 450 (Ariz. 1909).
128. Id. at 450.
129. Id. at 450–51.
130. Id. at 451. Similar to the Court in Crow Dog, the court in Ex parte Bi-a-lil-le underscored
that “administrative correction of their [Native American] conduct . . . cannot be sanctioned, unless
there is authority for it in the acts of Congress.” Compare id., with Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.
556, 567–72 (1823) (granting habeas petition because Congress had not authorized the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over crimes between Native Americans on reservations).
131. For additional examples, see generally BRAD ASHER, BEYOND THE RESERVATION:
INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE LAW IN WASHINGTON TERRITORY, 1853–1889 (1999) (“Indians
gained standing in territorial courts . . . . This shift in legal emphasis acknowledged the porousness
of racial boundaries but still sought to preserve and uphold critical legal distinctions between Indians
and whites.”).
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instituted to screen out immigrants who were viewed as undesirable at the
time.132 Ruling for the habeas petitioner, the Court concluded that states
lacked the jurisdiction and authority to regulate immigration.133 In response,
the federal government adopted inspection and detention schemes that were
substantially similar to the state schemes that the Court had invalidated.134
4. Operationalizing Detention Schemes.—In all three areas of law, habeas
proceedings helped to implement detention schemes by ensuring that
detentions were authorized by law—that the people being detained were
actually the people that the lawmaking branches wanted to be detained. 135
While this focus allowed habeas to liberate some individuals from detention,
it also meant that the habeas system reinforced the detention schemes.
a. Slavery and Freedom.—In the law of slavery, for example, habeas
courts developed doctrines that preserved slave owners’ ability to take slaves
to other states and territories without freeing them. During the period of
westward expansion, owners transported slaves to new states and federal
territories.136 Because different states had different laws on slavery, questions
arose about whether someone’s presence in a state or territory meant that they
were governed by that state or territory’s law.137 For example, in In re
Perkins,138 the California Supreme Court labeled all slaves brought to
California before 1852 during the height of the Gold Rush as fugitives who
could be taken and trafficked under the federal Fugitive Slave Act.139 Some
doctrines addressed what kinds of travel allowed a passers-through to gain
the benefit of the state’s laws.140 There, habeas courts developed a body of

132. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276–78 (1875) (state law prohibited “lewd
or debauched” women from landing from a foreign vessel unless they paid a bond).
133. Id. at 280–81.
134. See, e.g., Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 476 (1912) (excluding woman on
grounds that she was engaged in prostitution); LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 115 at 44–45 (describing
origins of Page Act’s restrictions on women engaged in prostitution as arising in part from state and
local agitation).
135. See also SALYER, supra note 49, at xiii (arguing that scholars “have not given adequate
consideration to how the laws were actually enforced by the administrative agencies and the federal
courts”).
136. LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION SONGS: SUING FOR FREEDOM BEFORE DRED SCOTT
57 (2014).
137. The overwhelming majority of freedom petitions in Missouri addressed the effect of the
laws of one state or territory on another state’s residents. Id. at 7–8.
138. 2 Cal. 424 (Ca. 1852).
139. Id. at 425.
140. See, e.g., VANDERVELDE, supra note 136, at 67 (noting one statute that provided that
slaves would not be freed if they were indentured within thirty days of entry into the territory or
removed within sixty days).
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law that effectively allowed private agreements to insulate slave owners from
anti-slavery laws.141
b. Native American Affairs.—In the area of Native American affairs,
habeas proceedings bolstered a theory of jurisdiction that supplied a
superficial basis to dispossess Natives of their lands. Habeas courts often
maintained that their focus was on whether a detainer had jurisdiction over a
detainee,142 and habeas courts reasoned that jurisdiction focused on place in
addition to personage.143 The focus on place coincided with a theory of
jurisdiction that furthered the American colonial project—a territorial theory
that imagined authority could be exercised over a given place.144
A territorial understanding of jurisdiction, and in particular, the mere
fact that Native Americans happened to be in a place over which the United
States asserted authority, had provided the legal basis for the United States’
claims of power over Native Americans and Native American land.145 Early
administrations insisted that Natives were subject to federal laws because
they were “within the limits of the United States.”146 The territorial theory of
jurisdiction also facilitated the dispossession of Native American lands by
minimizing Native claims to title. Johnson v. M‘Intosh147 relied on the
territorial theory of jurisdiction to justify the United States’ claim to Native

141. See id. at 79 (“[T]he distinction between a legally fully indentured servant and a slave was
merely a matter of a piece of paper and taking the slave before a clerk.”); id. at 67 (“This statute
does not appear to have been designed as much to secure freedom as it was thought to accommodate
bondage . . . .”).
142. See, e.g., In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 265 (1890) (habeas focused on jurisdiction); In re
Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 111–16 (1891) (same); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 124–25 (1897) (same);
Ex parte Crouch, 112 U.S. 178, 180 (1884) (same); Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876) (same);
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202–03 (1830) (same).
143. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 575–79 (1891) (describing jurisdiction as
concerned with place); Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 582, 582 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879) (No. 11,719)
(stating that the Court’s jurisdiction “depends upon three things: First, the nature of the offence;
second, the status as to nationality of the person committing it and the person against whom it is
committed; and, third, the place where it is committed”).
144. Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 872–
87 (1999); see generally CHARLES S. MAIER, ONCE WITHIN BORDERS: TERRITORIES OF POWER,
WEALTH, AND BELONGING SINCE 1500 (2016).
145. See Gregory Ablavsky, Sovereign Metaphors in Indian Law, 80 MONT. L. REV. 11, 13–14
(2019) (“The new nation initially made an abortive attempt . . . [to] label[] the Native peoples within
its new borders as ‘conquered,’ and so subject to the jurisdiction of both state and federal
governments.”) [hereinafter: Ablavsky, Sovereign Metaphors]; Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the
Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1062–67 (2015) (describing how U.S. officials
claimed Native Americans “possessed full sovereignty” and independence, but this status was
subordinated to their relationship with the U.S., such that “due to their inclusion within the United
States, Native nations were not free to negotiate or associate with other Euro-American nations”).
146. Ablavsky, Sovereign Metaphors, supra note 145, at 13–14.
147. 21 U.S. 543 (8 Wheat.) (1823).
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lands.148 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia149 similarly rejected Native nations’
power to sue in federal court precisely because Native nations “reside within
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States” and “they are considered
as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States.”150
Ex parte Crow Dog, the habeas case that precipitated modern criminal
jurisdiction over Native American affairs, relied on the territorial theory of
jurisdiction to lay the basis for extensive federal authority over tribes. The
Court in Crow Dog reasoned that the reservation was “within the
geographical limits of the Territory of Dakota” and therefore “under the laws
of the United States.”151 It was because “the locus in quo of the alleged
offense” was “territorially” within the United States that United States courts
could have authority over it.152 The Court in United States v. Kagama153 later
echoed this claim when it upheld the Major Crimes Act: Congress had
authority over Native Americans because “Indians are within the
geographical limits of the United States” and “[t]he soil and the people within
these limits are under the political control of the Government.”154
The emphasis on place as integral to jurisdiction furthered the colonial
project in more specific ways as well. Precisely demarcating places allowed
the federal government to support westward expansion by making land
exchangeable.155 Habeas proceedings facilitated the marking and designation
of lands as habeas courts determined whether particular lands fell within the
purview of the federal government, states, or tribes. Habeas proceedings
formalized treaties and customary agreements between states, tribes, and the
federal government and sorted through conflicting practices in order to
cleanly categorize land.156 Habeas proceedings also zeroed in on more
particular determinations about certain parcels of land, such as whether land

148. Id. at 573, 587–88 (explaining that the first Europeans to physically arrive at the land had
“the sole right of acquiring the soil” and “unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule”).
149. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
150. Id. at 17.
151. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 559 (1883).
152. Id. at 562.
153. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
154. Id. at 379.
155. K-Sue Park, Conquest and Slavery in the Property Law Course: Teaching Notes 6–7
(Georgetown L. Fac. Publ’ns and Other Works, July 24, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659947
[https://perma.cc/F9SL-VELM] (“[T]hrough the processes of territorial expansion and land
extraction from tribes, the Country developed its institutions for defining, organizing, and
distributing property, and regulating a market in land.”); see AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF
AMERICAN FREEDOM 105 (2010) (“Control of such land was believed necessary for republican and
utopian visions of empire, because expansion would create a permanent condition of peace as well
as the moral and economic basis for freedom.”).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658, 663 (W.D. Ark. 1885) (assessing whether law
was a reservation by sorting out conflicting customs).
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had been allotted (i.e., transferred to individual tribe members).157 By
clearing up conflicting claims of authority over land, the habeas process
facilitated a land system that drove Westward expansion.158
B.

Encoding Race, Citizenship, Membership, and Exclusion

Habeas proceedings also incorporated race and citizenship into the
habeas process. Habeas cases helped to construct racial categories by
analyzing whether detentions were authorized by laws that incorporated race
and citizenship. And habeas proceedings provided a mechanism to undercut
detentions that attempted to challenge racial subordination and racial
hierarchies.
1. Habeas and the Process of Racialization
a. Slavery and Freedom.—Habeas performed a liberating function within
the regime of slavery when enslaved individuals used habeas proceedings to
assert their freedom via freedom petitions.159 But because habeas proceedings
were trained on whether detentions were authorized by law, they
incorporated the racial law of slavery: Habeas proceedings sought to
determine which individuals were legally Black and subject to the regime of
slavery.160
These habeas proceedings contributed to the development of the legal
architecture of race. In order to determine if a person’s detention was legally
authorized, habeas courts analyzed whether a person was Black. Whether a
person was considered Black depended on a set of considerations, including
social conditions and societal views, which courts stitched together into a

157. E.g., Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 29, 32–35 (7th Cir. 1938). For descriptions of allotment,
see ROBERT N. CLINTON, NELL JESSUP NEWTON & MONROE E. PRICE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 147–52 (3d ed. 1991); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
158. See RANA, supra note 155, at 105.
159. VANDERVELDE, supra note 136, at 8–9 (describing freedom petitions); id. at 25 (noting
that the very first freedom petition was stylized as a habeas petition). For a discussion of examples
of freedom petitions stylized as habeas petitions, see id. at 29, 47 and KIMBERLY M. WELCH, BLACK
LITIGANTS IN THE ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN SOUTH 82 (2018) (providing an example of the
liberating function of habeas).
160. The story that emerges is consistent with Ariela Gross and Alejandro de la Fuente’s
historical study of three slave economies in the lead up to the Civil War. See ALEJANDRO DE LA
FUENTE & ARIELA J. GROSS, BECOMING FREE, BECOMING BLACK: RACE, FREEDOM, AND LAW IN
CUBA, VIRGINIA, AND LOUISIANA 219–20 (2020) (describing the incorporation of slavery and
freedom suits in mid-nineteenth century Cuba, Virginia, and Louisiana). De la Fuente and Gross
concluded that the law of freedom and laws governing newly freed slaves, not just the law of slavery,
created the legal boundaries between Black and white persons. Id. at 221–22, 224.
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racially productive body of law.161 Habeas courts pointed to the physical
attributes of a person, like the size of their nose or physical stature,162 in
addition to hair texture.163 They also focused on ancestry and descent,164 and
a person’s reputation within the community factored into the proceedings,165
which allowed courts to draw on racial stereotypes, including anti-Black
tropes about work ethic.166 In the course of determining who could be free
and on what terms, habeas jurisprudence helped to develop and reinforce the
racial categories at the base of the institution of slavery.
b. Native American Affairs.—A similar dynamic played out in Native
American affairs. In order to determine whether a detention was
jurisdictionally sound, habeas courts zeroed in on whether persons were
Native Americans. Similar to freedom petitions, habeas courts developed a
body of law that helped to construct Native Americans as a distinct racial
group. They examined whether petitioners were “Indians by blood”;167
whether they had “blood of the race”;168 where they resided;169 how they lived

161. See ANNE TWITTY, BEFORE DRED SCOTT: SLAVERY AND LEGAL CULTURE IN THE
AMERICAN CONFLUENCE, 1787–1857, at 67 (2016) (describing captions that described persons in
terms of color).
162. See, e.g., Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 140 (1806) (Tucker, J., concurring)
(determining that evidence of a person’s nose shape was admissible and proper to determine
someone’s race); WELCH, supra note 159, at 67, 107 (describing focus of freedom petitions on
reputation and physical appearance, such as “blunt & heavy features” and “large boned”).
163. See, e.g., VANDERVELDE, supra note 136, at 47 (describing testimony taken to determine
whether a woman “was actually Indian at all[,]” which included a description of her hair); Wright,
11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 140 (referring to “the long, straight, black hair of the native aborigines”).
164. See, e.g., VANDERVELDE, supra note 136, at 78 (describing habeas petitions of children
“of the original French slaves” exempted from operation of the Northwest Ordinance). This included
deciding whether persons descended from Natchez Indians on their mother’s side could be slaves.
Marguerite v. Chouteau, 3 Mo. 540, 541 (1834); see also VANDERVELDE, supra note 136, at 39–
40 (“Missouri . . . law presumed that persons of color were slaves. . . . Knowing the times and places
of one’s ownership and how that ownership changed . . . were factors that could militate either for
or against success.”).
165. See, e.g., TWITTY, supra note 161, at 81 (“Slaves who remained on free soil . . . frequently
merited the commentary of the community[,]” which “[t]hey did . . . by cultivating reputations as
individuals who were entitled to their freedom.”); WELCH, supra note 159, at 67 (“[E]nslaved
people used their reputations to defend themselves against those who might object to giving them
their freedom.”).
166. See WELCH, supra note 159, at 67–69 (arguing that the “politics of reputation” played a
significant role in freedom suits for both enslaved and free Black people).
167. E.g., In re Wolf, 27 F. 606, 609 (W.D. Ark. 1886); In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 108
(1891); Quagon v. Biddle, 5 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir. 1925); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 29–30 (7th
Cir. 1938).
168. In re Wolf, 27 F. at 609; see also Ex parte Reynolds. 20 F. Cas. 582, 583 (C.C.W.D. Ark.)
(No. 11,719) (1879) (“[H]er mother had some Indian blood in her veins.”); id. at 585 (“defining the
nationality of persons according to the quantum of . . . blood in the veins of the person”).
169. See, e.g., In re Wolf, 27 F. at 609 (noting that petitioners “reside in and are a part of the
Cherokee Nation”).
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(whether on individually or communally owned land);170 the manner in which
they committed a crime;171 their affiliation and association with a tribe;172
who they were married to;173 their parentage;174 their reputation in the
community;175 whether their “usages and customs . . . belong[] to their
race”;176 and other characteristics.
In addition to other harms associated with racialization, i.e., the process
of constructing a group as a distinct race,177 the racialization of Native
Americans was used to diminish Natives’ political authority. The idea that
Native nations were a distinct race, rather than or in addition to a political
group, provided a reason to deny Native populations the authority enjoyed
by governments, including the ability to sue in federal court,178 the authority
to make treaties,179 the power to establish membership and citizenship,180 and
the authority to govern their people (and others).181 The government denied
Native Americans these powers by insisting that Native Americans were

170. See, e.g., In re Now-Ge-Zhuck, 76 P. 877, 877 (Kan. 1904) (noting that petitioner had
resided on an Indian reservation his whole life); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 30 (noting that petitioner
had “not been enrolled with any . . . reservation”).
171. See, e.g., Gon-shay-ee, Petr., 130 U.S. 343, 345 (noting that petitioner acted “feloniously,
willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought”).
172. See, e.g., In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. at 116 (petitioner “was a member of the Cherokee
Nation by adoption”); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 493 (1905), overruled in part by United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916) (“Congress only has power to regulate commerce of a tribe of Indians
who maintain their tribal relations . . . .”).
173. See, e.g., Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. at 583 (“[Petitioner] being a white man by
nationality[] [and] by birth,” was “only an Indian by marriage . . . .”); Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas.
353, 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720) (discussing petitioner’s property rights following the
death of his wife, who was a member of the Cherokee Nation).
174. See, e.g., Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 30 (“His mother was a full-blooded Indian . . . .”).
175. See, e.g., id. (noting petitioner “maintained tribal relations with the Indians”).
176. See, e.g., id. at 30 (defining “Indian” within a statute as meaning “those who by the usages
and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race”); ASHER, supra note 131 at 49–
50 (describing John Heo’s habeas petition, which asserted “cultural transformation” as grounds to
leave a reservation).
177. Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 880 (2015);
see also Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 971 (2002)
(discussing “pervasive stereotypes as to the color of crime”).
178. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18, 20 (1831) (denying tribes standing to sue
under Article III as foreign states).
179. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (stating that tribes are not entities “with whom the United States may
contract by treaty”); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (describing history of
treaty making with tribes).
180. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846) (denying tribes’ ability to offer
citizenship to whites, reasoning that Native peoples “have never been acknowledged or treated as
independent nations”).
181. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (denying tribe ability
to prosecute nonmembers).
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different from nations or political communities—they were tribes or races.182
Some of the discrete tests that habeas courts developed to determine who was
Native American also facilitated the diminishment of Native authority.183
One measure of whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs retained jurisdiction
over an individual was whether the individual had voluntarily disaffiliated
from their tribe.184 That legal test provided an incentive for Native Americans
to break ties with Native nations in order to free themselves from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs’ control.185
c. Immigration.—Habeas courts also produced a body of law that
racialized newly targeted groups of immigrants. In determining whether a
habeas petitioner was an American citizen, habeas courts examined whether
they “belong[ed] to the Chinese race”;186 whether a petitioner’s testimony
182. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (affirming congressional authority
to regulate tribes because “[t]he relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United
States . . . to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one, and of complex
character”); see also Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901) (“Owing to the natural
infirmities of the Indian character, their fiery tempers, impatience of restraint, their mutual
jealousies and animosities, their nomadic habits, and lack of mental training, they have as a rule
shown a total want of that cohesive force necessary to the making up of a nation . . . .”); see
generally Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original
Constitutional Meaning, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025, 1033–42 (2018) (exploring the different meanings
of the words “tribe” and “nation” in late eighteenth century Anglo–American discourse to describe
Native American politics). Of course, political communities may also be defined by race; these
cases and others seem to define the political community of the United States in racial terms.
183. For example, tribal membership was firmly unidirectional: Individuals could choose to
disaffiliate with a tribe, which suggests tribes are nations, but tribes could not extend citizenship to
anyone who wanted to affiliate with and become a member of a tribe. Compare Ex parte Kenyon,
14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720) (“[T]he petitioner had clearly abandoned the
Indian nation and was then only subject to the laws of the place of his domicile.”), with United
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846) (holding that “a white man who at a mature age is adopted
in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian”).
184. See Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. at 355 (“[T]he petitioner had clearly abandoned the Indian
nation and was then only subject to the laws of the place of his domicile.”); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d
28, 30–32 (7th Cir. 1938) (holding that defendant, who was recognized as “Indian,” lived in a
reservation, and maintained tribal relations, was still “Indian” despite not being enrolled in a tribe);
In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 116 (1891) (“Mayfield was a member of the Cherokee Nation by
adoption, if not by nativity . . . .”); Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 582, 583 (8th Cir. 1879) (No.
11,719) (“If we invoke the principle that when the members of an Indian tribe scatter themselves
among the citizens of the United States . . . they are merged in the mass of our people, . . . subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts thereof . . . it may, to say the least of it, become a very serious
question” whether a given person is considered to be an Indian or not.).
185. At the time, BIA agents claimed the authority to force individuals to remain on reservation
lands, to remain in marriages, and to send children to schools designed to minimize their affiliation
with Native culture, among other things. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
182–85 (1994) (describing what BIA authority could look like); see also Maggie Blackhawk,
Federal Indian Law As Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1840–42 (2019)
(describing tensions in the relationship between federal Indian law and administrative law).
186. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 905 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
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was credible;187 a habeas petitioner’s parentage;188 the demeanor and
mannerisms of Chinese witnesses;189 a person’s “appearance and
language”;190 “discrepanc[ies] between the testimony of [a] petitioner
and . . . white witness[es]”;191 and photographs of family members.192 They
designated certain categories of immigrants as forever foreign, warning that
whether certain persons stay “for a shorter or longer time, . . . they continue
to be aliens.”193
As was true in the area of Native American affairs, racialization
diminished the stature of Chinese immigrants. As a nation, China was an
economic power with whom many political elites in the 1800s desperately
wanted to cultivate trade and partnerships.194 Yet the racialization of Chinese
immigrants depicted them as too foreign to live in accordance with valuable
American customs and practices.195
The immigration cases, as well as cases on Native American affairs, also
reveal the complicated relationship between race and citizenship. While race
and citizenship are distinct, they operated in conjunction with one another in
mutually reinforcing ways. In the immigration cases, noncitizenship was an
entry point to conceiving certain groups of immigrants as members of a
different racial group. In Native American affairs, by contrast, race
functioned as evidence of noncitizenship.196

187. See Woey Ho v. United States, 109 F. 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1901) (questioning the credibility
of a witness’s testimony about petitioner’s birth); United States v. Chung Fun Sun, 63 F. 261, 263
(N.D.N.Y. 1894) (questioning petitioner’s claim that he was a Chinese merchant); United States v.
Chin Len, 187 F. 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1911) (discussing the truthfulness of petitioner’s testimony);
Woo Jew Dip v. United States, 192 F. 471, 473–74 (5th Cir. 1911) (discussing the credibility of
appellant’s and witnesses’ testimony).
188. Lee Sing Far v. United States, 94 F. 834, 836–37 (9th Cir. 1899) (asserting that “[f]rom
the testimony it appears that appellant is of Chinese parentage”).
189. Id. at 837 (claiming that government cross-examination of Chinese witnesses is important
for “testing the intelligence, manner, impartiality, truthfulness, and integrity of the witness”); cf. In
re Tom Mun, 47 F. 722, 722 (N.D. Cal. 1888) (relying on records in “the Six Company’s book,” a
major conglomerate of Chinese-owned businesses). For more on the Six Companies, see SALYER,
supra note 49, at 40–42.
190. Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 49 F.146, 148 (9th Cir. 1892).
191. In re Tom Mun, 47 F. at 722.
192. Yee Chung v. United States. 243 F. 126, 130 (9th Cir. 1917) (recounting how the appellant
was shown a photo that he claimed held “resemblance to [his] father[]”); see also ESTELLE T. LAU,
PAPER FAMILIES 42–43 (2006) (documenting anti-Chinese stereotypes in these proceedings).
193. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893). Courts invoked tropes about
how Chinese petitioners could not be believed. See Lee v. United States, 94 F. 834, 835 (9th Cir.
1899) (suggesting “[t]he practice is not uncommon in the Chinese cases” for counsel not to raise
objections during administrative proceedings and wait to do so in habeas ones).
194. See LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 55–62 (explaining that the general policy towards
Chinese immigrants was one of exclusion but Congress created a myriad of exceptions for Chinese
elites or for migration that benefited American business interests).
195. See supra notes 111–119 (outlining reasoning in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting).
196. See supra notes 173–185 and accompanying text.
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2. Challenging Anti-Subordinating Detentions.—Another way habeas
proceedings reinforced racial hierarchies was by undercutting detentions that
sought to challenge racial subordination. For example, habeas proceedings
invalidated detentions that attempted to protect free Blacks from the
institution of slavery by prosecuting fugitive-slave catchers. Habeas was the
vehicle to free persons who carried out slavery by forcing people into slavery:
Instead of freeing individuals from slavery, habeas freed the persons who
sold them into slavery. In several cases, federal courts granted writs of habeas
corpus to free fugitive-slave hunters from state criminal process.197 The
courts reasoned that federal law authorized the individuals to find fugitive
slaves and force them into slavery.198
Habeas also enforced the federal government’s authority by protecting
persons who exercised authority over Native American affairs. In Rainbow
v. Young,199 state officers arrested two Indian policemen at the Winnebago
Indian Reservation for removing an individual from the reservation.200 A
federal court freed the Indian policemen via a habeas petition, confirming the
federal government’s broad powers over Native American affairs and
allowing the federal government to create a police force immune from state
criminal laws.201
C.

Engaging in a Subordinating Dialectic
Finally, habeas proceedings allowed courts to engage in a subordinating
dialectic with lawmaking branches that were interested in pursuing
colonialism and racial subordination but in seemingly lawful ways. Habeas
proceedings identified gaps in detention schemes, which fueled the expansion
of the detention schemes and also preemptively supplied justifications for
more far-reaching ones. Some of the opinions may have deliberately sought

197. E.g., Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445, 448 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7,259) (releasing
captors acting under the Fugitive Slave Act by writ of habeas corpus); Ex parte Robinson
(Robinson II), 20 F. Cas. 965, 969 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 11,934) (same).
198. See, e.g., Robinson II, 20 F. Cas. at 969 (releasing captors acting under the Fugitive Slave
Act by writ of habeas corpus); Ex parte Robinson (Robinson I), 20 F. Cas. 969, 969, 972 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1855) (No. 11,935) (same); United States ex rel. Garland v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1318, 1319–20
(D. Wis. 1854) (No. 15,811) (same); see also DUKER, supra note 21, at 188 (noting that writs of
habeas corpus freed officials acting pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Act from northern state jails).
The habeas proceedings that freed Fugitive Slave Act kidnappers were based on the Force Act of
1833, which was passed in response to South Carolina’s threats to nullify President Jackson’s tariffs.
JUSTIN WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 46–47 (Jeffrey
K. Tulis & Sanford Levinson eds., 2011). Under the Force Act, persons acting under federal law
could use habeas to challenge state criminal process against them. Id. Federal law previously
permitted federal courts to issue writs only on behalf of prisoners held “in custody . . . of the
authority of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 §14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (1789).
199. 161 F. 835 (8th Cir. 1908).
200. Id. at 836.
201. Id. at 835–37.
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to nudge Congress to expand the detention schemes, whereas others probably
just churned through a legal analysis that was focused on determining
whether a detention was authorized by statute. Either way, the habeas process
signaled to Congress that it could address the “problem” of liberating a
federal detainee by expanding a detention scheme.
1. Native American Affairs.—Consider Ex parte Crow Dog, which ruled
in favor of the detainee.202 Sydney Harring has written previously about how
the government selected Crow Dog as the case to bring to the Court from
among several possible ones, knowing that if it lost, the facts of the case
would lead to cries for additional federal intervention.203 The government’s
brief to the Supreme Court is a mere thirteen pages and almost exclusively
quotes the lower court decisions in the case.204 After quoting the opinions, it
ends with this statement: “Without further elaboration, we think it clear that
the jurisdiction of the district court . . . should be sustained.”205
The reasoning in the Supreme Court’s eventual decision did end up
playing into calls for additional federal intervention, stoking fears that Crow
Dog would get away with a crime if the federal government did not try him
in federal court.206 The Court described the tribal justice system as “red man’s
revenge” and federal law as the way to restrain “the strongest prejudices of
[Natives’] savage nature.”207 Relying on the principles spelled out in Ex parte
Crow Dog and the Court’s concerns about the absence of federal legislation,
Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act, which provided for federal
jurisdiction over certain enumerated crimes committed by tribal members on
reservation lands.208 Several legislators specifically noted that the statute was
a response to Crow Dog,209 a point the government highlighted in briefs when
202. 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
203. See HARRING, supra note 185, at 103, 112–13.
204. Brief of the United States at 6–13, Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (No. 8).
205. Id. at 13.
206. See Gulig & Harring, supra note 102, at 89 (“[Crow Dog] had, in the view of many white
Americans of the day, ‘gotten away with murder,’ and the case served as the basis for a Bureau of
Indian Affairs (‘BIA’) assault on Indian customary law . . . .”).
207. 109 U.S. at 571; see also In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115–16 (1891) (“The policy of
Congress has evidently been to vest in the inhabitants of the Indian country such power of selfgovernment as was thought to be consistent with the safety of the white population . . . and to
encourage them [to raise] themselves to our standard of civilization.”).
208. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 362 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153);
see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1885) (explaining that the Act of March 3,
1885, was meant to include certain crimes on reservations that Crow Dog would have excluded);
see Cleveland, supra note 37, at 59 (noting that “[t]he Major Crimes Act . . . had been adopted in
reaction to the Court’s decision in Crow Dog”).
209. 16 CONG. REC. 934 (statement of Rep. Cutcheon) (“We all remember the case of Crow
Dog . . . . He returned to his reservation, feeling, as the Commissioner says, a great deal more
important than any of the chiefs of his tribe.”); see also id. at 935 (statement of Rep Cutcheon) (“[I]n
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the Major Crimes Act was challenged.210 And although the Court in Crow
Dog concluded that Congress had not exercised the power to criminalize
actions between Native persons and Native lands, it went out of its way to
outline the reasons why Congress had that power it had not yet exercised.
Three years later, relying on the reasoning in Crow Dog, the Court upheld
the Act after having suggested there was a need for it.211
A similar dynamic played out in In re Heff.212 In that case, the Court
granted a habeas petition on the ground that federal laws regulating the sale
of liquor to Native Americans did not apply to Native persons who were
citizens.213 The Court concluded that Native Americans became citizens after
federal statutes extinguished tribal authority and individual Natives
disaffiliated with tribes, and that citizenship was incompatible with federal
plenary authority.214 In response to Heff, Congress adopted the Burke Act,
which deferred Native citizenship until Native Americans no longer held
their lands in trust.215 In a later case interpreting the Burke Act, the Court
disavowed Heff and explained that Native citizens could “remain[] Indians
by race,” which allowed Congress to retain “jurisdiction over the individual
members of this dependent race.”216
The progression from Heff provides a snapshot of the complicated
relationship between race and citizenship that habeas courts navigated and
reproduced. In the post-Heff cases, as well as in other Native American affairs
cases, race operated as evidence of (non)citizenship: The construction of
Native Americans as a different racial group served as evidence that they
were not citizens. This logic reinforced the significance of the boundary
between Native Americans and whites and allowed courts to hold that
conferring citizenship on Native Americans did not eliminate Congress’s
expansive authority over them.

the case of ‘Ex parte Crow Dog,’ . . . the district court of Dakota was without jurisdiction . . . . If
offenses of this character cannot be tried in the courts of the United States there is no tribunal in
which the crime of murder can be punished.” (quoting report of the Secretary of the Interior)).
210. See Brief of the United States at 15, Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (No. 1246).
211. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382–83 (citing Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556).
212. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905), overruled in part by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591
(1916).
213. Id. at 508–09. A mere ten years later, in United States v. Nice, the Court reversed this
holding, concluding that “[c]itizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued
guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emancipating the Indians or placing
them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for their protection.” 241 U.S. 591, 598
(1916).
214. In re Heff, 197 U.S. at 509, overruled in part by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
215. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349);
see Cleveland, supra note 37, at 75 (noting that the Burke Act was “[p]artly in response to Heff”).
216. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290–91 (1909); see also Nice, 241 U.S. at 601
(overruling Heff).
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The inferences that courts drew about race and citizenship operated in
different directions in the area of Native American affairs, where race
provided evidence of noncitizenship, than in immigration, where
noncitizenship provided evidence of a distinct racial group. But the end result
was the same. The idea that certain groups were members of a different race
was used to justify more expansive, far-reaching powers over immigration
and Native American affairs.
2. Immigration.—In immigration cases, habeas proceedings also
identified specific gaps in detention schemes as individuals successfully
argued that they did not fall within the group of persons who were subject to
detention. These decisions then prompted Congress to expand the detention
schemes. Chew Heong v. United States217 addressed an 1882 statute that
prohibited the arrival of new Chinese laborers.218 Congress amended the
statute to say that a customs certificate was the only accepted evidence for
reentry,219 but Chew Heong had departed the country prior to passage of the
statutes.220 He argued that the statute was inconsistent with a treaty
guaranteeing Chinese laborers the ability to enter and exit the United
States.221 The Court ultimately sided with Chew Heong, concluding that the
statute had to be interpreted as consistent with the treaty.222
Congress responded by enacting the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act, which
amended exclusion laws to bar all Chinese laborers who had left the United
States from returning whether or not they had certificates.223 In other cases
arising out of the government’s earlier anti-Chinese exclusion laws, habeas
petitioners argued that prior residents were not subject to the Chinese
Exclusion Act224 and that merchants were not subject to the requirements for
entry into the United States.225 When courts agreed with these interpretations,

217. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
218. Id. at 438 (discussing Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, §§ 1, 4–6, 15, 22 Stat. 58, 59–61).
219. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 4, 23 Stat. 115, 115–16.
220. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 536–37.
221. Brief of Plaintiff-In-Error by Attorney Riordan at 11–13, Chew Heong, 112 U.S. 536
(No. 1088). He also made a due process claim. Id. at 40–41.
222. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 560.
223. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, §§ 1–2, 25 Stat. 504, 504.
224. See In re Chin Ah On, 18 F. 506, 506 (D. Cal. 1883) (“The question presented for
decision . . . is whether a Chinese laborer . . . who went to China before the Act of Congress of
May 6, 1882, was passed, is entitled to land at this port without producing the certificate required
by that act.”).
225. In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605, 606 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); see In re Tung Yeong, 19 F.
184, 188 (D. Cal. 1884) (describing courts’ difficulty with defining “merchants” as distinguished
from “laborers” given that applicable treaties “declare[d] that the only class to be excluded are
laborers”). For a discussion about how these cases furthered imperial interests, see LEW-WILLIAMS,
supra note 115, at 61–62.
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Congress responded by closing the gaps just two years later.226 Some of the
decisions that prompted Congress to expand the detention schemes were
lower court decisions.227
Also, similar to the dynamic in Native American affairs cases, courts
offered preemptive justifications for future legislative restrictions on
immigration in some of the habeas cases. For example, in Chae Chan Ping,
which upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Court opined that the
“enforcement” of prior exclusion acts “was attended with great
embarrassment, from the suspicious nature, in many instances, of the
testimony offered to establish the residence of the parties, arising from the
loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an oath.”228
When Congress subsequently required Chinese immigrants to prove their
residence with the testimony of white witnesses, the Court pointed to that
language as a justification for the additional restrictions.229 The Court’s
decisions upholding the exclusion and deportation laws preemptively closed
off constitutional debates about the propriety and scope of Congress’s
exclusion and deportation powers.
Outside of the habeas context, courts have signaled to Congress about
how to revise a law in order to address legal defects in it.230 But the focus in
habeas proceedings was on whether detentions were authorized by law; that
was a key component of the habeas process. That structure inherently called
on courts to identify gaps in detention schemes—and flag ways for Congress
to expand detentions.
III. Habeas, Remedies, and Race
This Part uses the case studies to explore the doctrine and theory of
habeas and the nature and function of judicial remedies more generally.
Judicial remedies are commonly thought of as constraints on the government
that protect individual rights and liberty. But judicial remedies, including

226. See Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, §§ 4, 6, 23 Stat. 115, 115–17 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. §§ 262–297) (requiring that United States officials create certificates for departing Chinese
laborers and merchants to present upon their return); see also Hudson J. Janisch, The Chinese, the
Courts, and the Constitution 596–97, 679–89 (January 11, 1971) (J.S.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file with author) (describing successes in habeas litigation in the lower courts and the
tension between existing racial animus and the lower courts’ jurisprudence at the time).
227. Indeed, some individual judges wrote to Congress asking Congress to expand the detention
schemes. See SALYER, supra note 49, at 21 (“[T]he federal judges . . . were among those who sent
letters in support of sterner measures though the judges acted primarily out of their despair over
their crushing caseload.”).
228. Id. at 598.
229. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729–30 (1893).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–62 (1995) (invalidating statute and
explaining that it “contains no jurisdictional element”); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038,
1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding revised statute with jurisdictional element).
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habeas, can also empower the government by legitimating abusive
government practices that deprive individuals of liberty. That is not to
suggest that one of those functions is the real story of habeas or the
predominant function of judicial remedies. Almost by necessity, remedies,
including habeas, serve both purposes. Yet somehow that point has been
obscured when it comes to habeas, and that omission has had real
consequences. Getting only half the story—or at least telling only half the
story—helped to fold habeas into the legal apparatus for American
colonialism. Appreciating the different functions that habeas may serve helps
to construct a narrower, more precise account about when habeas may
actually be great.
Habeas may not have uniquely facilitated racial subordination or
colonialism relative to other parts of the law. That is, it may be possible to
construct accounts showcasing how other remedies, other bases for
jurisdiction, or other areas of law created, reinforced, and reflected racial
hierarchies and colonialism. But it is still helpful to understand the features
of habeas that allowed it to become part of the legal regime of American
colonialism and racial subordination.231 Understanding these mechanisms
provides a more accurate understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of
the writ, which helps to assess various models or reform proposals to habeas.
And unpacking the specific legal mechanics of colonialism and racial
subordination “illuminate[s] the technical role that the law and legal
institutions played in those processes.”232
Subpart III(A) explains how appreciating the two faces of habeas helps
to assess habeas-reform proposals and to construct a preliminary account for
when habeas may serve some of the ends associated with the Great Writ.
Subpart III(B) explains how the very idea of the myth of the great writ is part
of what enabled habeas to legitimate government power and private
hierarchies and to construct racial categories and parallel racialized theories
of power. Jettisoning the myth—and appreciating when and under what
circumstances habeas may be great—is one important, albeit partial, response
to the case studies.
A.

Habeas Doctrine and Reform
Three features of habeas helped to produce the less salutary usages of
the writ:

231. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 1999 (1992) (“[A] proper determination of
the Great Writ’s future requires an accurate understanding of its past.”).
232. Park, supra note 8, at 1983.

1LITMAN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

•

12/21/2021 6:34 PM

The Myth of the Great Writ

257

the focus on jurisdiction, which was flexible enough to allow
courts to decide when detentions were lawful and to encode race
and citizenship in those rules;

•

the insistent focus on whether detentions were authorized by law,
which solidified the lawmaking branches’ power to expand
abusive government practices and obviated any inquiry into
whether detentions served anti-subordinating purposes;
• the status quo bias of the remedy, which lent itself to singular
challenges and made it easier for habeas to push back against
people who challenged the status quo.
While some of these features are unique to habeas, others may be
generalizable to remedies besides habeas. Identifying and naming the
features particular to habeas, however, provides a different lens to evaluate
habeas-reform projects. It also supplies a starting point for constructing a
more precise account about when and under what circumstances habeas may
fulfill some of the promise of the myth of the great writ.

1. Jurisdiction.—In some respects, the preceding case studies reaffirm
the importance of jurisdiction to habeas. The idea that “jurisdiction” is a key
element of habeas review has animated both scholarly and judicial critiques
of habeas as well as proposed reforms to habeas. After the Supreme Court
held that persons convicted in state court could relitigate claims in federal
habeas even where the claims had been raised in state proceedings, Paul Bator
authored Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners.233 The article outlines what became known as the “process” theory
of federal habeas, which maintains that habeas review should be available for
claims that could have been raised previously only if those prior proceedings
did not provide a full and fair process.234 The proposal was premised on
Bator’s claim that federal habeas was, at its core, supposed to supply judicial
review to ascertain whether a detainer had jurisdiction over a detainee.235
While Bator’s critique and accompanying reforms were aimed largely
at ascertaining the proper scope of federal postconviction review for state
prisoners, then-Judge Gorsuch recently invoked the same idea to shape

233. Bator, supra note 27.
234. See id. at 486–87, 511–12 (“The issue [is] . . . whether the federal court should redetermine
the facts and the law in cases where there is no reason to suspect failure on the part of the state to
provide a full and conscientious adjudication of the federal claim . . . .”); Evan Tsen Lee, The
Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 152 & n.6 (1994) (referring to Bator’s
theory of habeas as the “process-only model”).
235. See id. at 465–66 (“[T]he black-letter principle of the common law [was] that the writ was
simply not available at all to one convicted of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
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federal habeas review for federal prisoners.236 Judge Gorsuch relied on the
principle that federal habeas review is available only for errors related to
jurisdiction to assert that federal prisoners who were wrongly convicted
because of an error of statutory interpretation did not have—and need not
have—access to federal habeas review to correct their wrongful
convictions.237
Bator and Gorsuch’s claims about the centrality of jurisdiction to habeas
have proven quite influential. Citing Bator, the Supreme Court adopted the
rule that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable “where the State has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim.”238 This past term, Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch invoked
Bator’s claim that “the writ was simply not available at all to one convicted
of crime by a court of competent jurisdiction” to argue that federal law could
preclude habeas review for constitutional claims that might affect the
likelihood that a convicted defendant was innocent.239 And after then-Judge
Gorsuch announced his view about the proper scope of federal habeas review,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed its own precedent
to adopt Gorsuch’s view.240 Under President Trump, the Department of
Justice changed positions to argue the same—that federal habeas review is
not available for federal prisoners who are mistakenly convicted because of
an error of statutory interpretation.241
To date, the rejoinder to these theories has been directed only or
primarily at the historical accuracy of its claims. That is, scholars have argued
that habeas courts did not just review cases to determine whether a detainer
had jurisdiction, or, alternatively, that the concept of jurisdiction was
236. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 592 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus
in its earliest form was largely a remedy against confinement imposed by a court lacking
jurisdiction . . . .”).
237. See id. (“[L]ike a statutory claim of innocence, lack of jurisdiction is not one of the two
authorized grounds upon which a successive § 2254 motion may be filed.”).
238. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475 n.7, 481–82 (1976).
239. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1563, 1566 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A
state court rejected petitioner’s [constitutional] claim that he was entitled to a unanimous jury
verdict . . . . AEDPA’s explicit directive thus independently resolves this case: ‘a writ of habeas
corpus . . . shall not be granted.’”).
240. See McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1080
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“We join the Tenth Circuit in applying the law as Congress wrote it and
hold that a change in caselaw does not make a motion to vacate a prisoner’s sentence ‘inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’” (quoting Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th
Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.)) (citations omitted)).
241. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 422–23 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 1318 (2019) (“In the district court, the Government took the position that Appellant . . . was
entitled to relief . . . . But now, on appeal, the Government has done an about-face . . . .”); see also
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, United States v. Wheeler, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (No. 18420) (“A federal prisoner . . . may not rely on a statutory decision that postdates his first
Section 2255 motion as a basis for seeking a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”).
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capacious enough to include many modern errors of constitutional criminal
procedure.242
The case studies offer a slightly different critique while adding some
context to questions about the historical accuracy of the theories. It is true
that courts emphasized that habeas was specifically concerned with whether
a detainer had jurisdiction over a detainee. As described in Part II, that aspect
of habeas facilitated courts’ ability to focus on race and citizenship and
emphasize their importance to governmental authority. Consider the Native
American affairs and immigration cases. In both areas, there were several
preconditions for valid detentions: an individual had to be Native American
or a noncitizen; an individual had to be in a specific place (outside the country
or on a reservation); and an individual had to have certain qualifying criminal
convictions or attributes that made them inadmissible. Yet the only
preconditions that courts identified as relevant to whether a detainer had
jurisdiction over a detainee concerned place and race and citizenship—
whether an individual was Native American or an (Asian) immigrant.243
Habeas courts emphasized the primacy of race and citizenship over
jurisdiction; they elevated the importance of race and citizenship over other
questions, such as whether an individual committed the offense for which
they were convicted.244 They did not review other preconditions for
jurisdiction, such as whether an individual had committed a qualifying crime
or possessed some trait that made them inadmissible.245

242. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 579, 661–63 (1982) (arguing that the scope of habeas historically is enough to justify full
relitigation of modern criminal procedure errors); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 575, 588–90 (1993) (arguing that the meaning of jurisdiction in earlier cases is ambiguous);
Jonathan R. Siegel, Habeas, History, and Hermeneutics, 64 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899955 [https://perma.cc/L5F8-ZHNK].
243. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133 (1924) (emphasizing
importance of citizenship and race to jurisdiction); Ex parte Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 111–16 (1891)
(same); Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 582, 585–86 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879) (No. 11,719) (same).
244. See, e.g., Ex parte Mayfield, 141 U.S. at 116 (“As Mayfield was a member of the Cherokee
Nation by adoption, if not by nativity, . . . he is amendable only to the courts of the nation . . . .”);
Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. at 585–86 (“Mr. Puryear was married to a woman who was legally a
member of the white race, or of the body politic known as citizens of the United States. He . . . was
a citizen of the United States, and being killed in the territorial jurisdiction of this court, it has
jurisdiction . . . .”).
245. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1923)
(acknowledging that “alienage is a condition, not a cause of deportation”); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 546–47 (1895) (error premised on scope of treaty not cognizable);
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1904) (alienage critical to
jurisdiction, not other preconditions for detention); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13
(1908) (granting writ to allow determination in court about citizenship); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922) (same); Tisi, 264 U.S. at 132–33 (“Such knowledge [of seditious character
of the printed matter] is not, like alienage, a jurisdictional fact.”); In re Day, 27 F. 678, 680–81
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (declining to redetermine whether detainees were public charges because that
did not go to jurisdiction).
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Appreciating this dynamic helps to evaluate Bator- or Gorsuch-like
claims about what constitutes the “core” of federal habeas review as well as
habeas-reform projects that are premised on those theories. As a matter of
historical practice, jurisdiction was a sufficiently malleable concept that it
allowed courts to establish the rules about when detentions were lawful and
to encode race and citizenship in those rules. Yet then-Judge Gorsuch
maintained that habeas review was required for federal criminal convictions
only where a court lacked jurisdiction and not where the statutory
preconditions for detention were absent.246
This theory does not accurately reflect the practice of habeas in the
nineteenth century, which Judge Gorsuch maintained involved review for
jurisdiction in cases involving criminal convictions and review for a lack of
legal process in cases involving federal executive detentions.247 Jurisdiction
was a guiding principle for habeas review of both court-ordered and
executive-ordered detentions. Courts reviewed detentions authorized by
criminal convictions (in the case of Native American affairs) and executive
determinations (in the case of immigration) in similar ways—focusing on
certain elements or preconditions for detention.248 Moreover, while Justice
Gorsuch maintained that jurisdiction has a particular, defined meaning that
does not include whether the statutory preconditions for detention were
satisfied,249 review for jurisdiction did include review of some of the statutory
preconditions for detention. Yet Justice Gorsuch would remove all cases of
statutory interpretation and statutory application from the core of habeas.250
That is not what review for jurisdiction meant.
Although the cases purported to focus on jurisdiction, that focus allowed
courts to determine the rules about what made a detention lawful. This
practice is consistent with Lee Kovarsky’s theory of habeas power, which
maintained that habeas includes the judicial power to determine when a

246. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that habeas review
is available where “defendant’s sentencing court had been abolished” but rejecting habeas for a
petitioner convicted under an erroneous statutory interpretation).
247. See id. at 583 n.4 (arguing that when the Suspension Clause was drafted, “[f]ederal
prisoners could use the writ [only] to challenge confinement imposed by a court that lacked
jurisdiction, . . . or detention by the executive without legal process” (alterations in original)
(quotations omitted)); Bator, supra note 27, at 475 (suggesting that jurisdiction might mean
something different in cases involving executive detentions versus judicial ones).
248. See supra notes 243–245.
249. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 586 n.6 (“In those cases involving new statutory interpretations,
after all, the prisoner committed acts that a court of competent jurisdiction at that time believed to
be criminal under the relevant statute.”); id. at 592 (noting that the Court has barred prisoners
“convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the wrong sovereign from bringing a successive
collateral attack to contest this conviction on this basis”).
250. See id. at 578 (holding that habeas does not provide relief in certain cases where circuit
precedent had erroneously foreclosed a statutory interpretation that would have resulted in
petitioner’s acquittal).

1LITMAN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

12/21/2021 6:34 PM

The Myth of the Great Writ

261

detention is lawful.251 Kovarsky depicted that theory as an alternative and
challenge to those who argue that jurisdiction is the core focus of habeas.
While habeas courts said that habeas was about jurisdiction, Kovarsky’s
theory better captures the substance of habeas practice.
Equally important, using jurisdiction as an animating or organizing
principle for federal habeas corpus risks replicating the errors of the past.
Jurisdiction helped incorporate race and citizenship into habeas review.
There are reasons to think that resurrecting a focus on jurisdiction could
accomplish similar results today. Indeed, it already has. Habeas has been the
vehicle to curb Native American tribes’ authority to protect tribal members.
With courts maintaining that habeas is particularly concerned about
jurisdiction, habeas has provided a forum to address whether Native tribes
have jurisdiction in different settings. Habeas limited Native nations’
authority to prosecute nontribal members in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,252 and later limited nations’ authority to prosecute members of other
tribes.253 Because of these decisions, only the federal government can
prosecute individuals for certain crimes that occur in Indian country. Yet the
remote location of some reservations makes it more difficult to prosecute
some crimes—difficulties that are reinforced by prosecutors’ resource
constraints as well as their ability to select which cases to prosecute. For
example, federal prosecutors declined to prosecute two-thirds of Indian
country cases involving sex crimes.254
Using jurisdiction to orient federal habeas review also ensured that
habeas would not remedy certain erroneous detentions. The focus on
jurisdiction was one reason why habeas courts did not live up to the myth of
the great writ and correct unauthorized detentions in cases where the law was
mistakenly applied to some individual. Habeas courts maintained that they

251. Kovarsky, supra note 52, at 795, 810 (arguing that habeas power is the judicial power to
determine if a detention is lawful); see id. at 758 (“Habeas has always been an instrument of judicial
power . . . .”).
252. 435 U.S. 191, 199 (1978) (“At least one court has previously considered the power of
Indian Courts to try non-Indians and it also held against jurisdiction.”); see also FELIX S. COHEN,
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 148 (1941) (“[A]ttempts of tribes
to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . have been generally condemned by the federal courts
since the end of the treaty-making period, and the writ of habeas corpus has been used to discharge
white defendants from tribal custody.”).
253. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). Congress altered that rule by statute. See 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (recognizing and affirming the existence of “inherent power . . . to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians”); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 193 (2004) (holding
that “Congress possessed constitutional power to lift or relax restrictions on Indian tribes’ criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians”).
254. Ending Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN L. RES. CTR., https://indianlaw.org/issue
/ending-violence-against-native-women [https://perma.cc/KB3T-NYGS]. Native American women
are much more likely than white women to be victims of sexual violence, and non-Indians commit
almost 96% of the violence against Native women. Id.
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would not review cases to determine whether preconditions for detention
other than race, citizenship, and place were satisfied—even if that meant a
detention was not authorized by law.255
The fact that using jurisdiction as an organizing principle in habeas
supplied the basis for focusing on race and citizenship and for sanitizing
erroneous detentions raises some concerns about calls to re-center the role of
jurisdiction in habeas.
2. Detentions Authorized by Law.—Habeas courts also maintained that
another focal point of habeas proceedings was whether detentions were
authorized by law. That focus also allowed habeas to become part of the legal
apparatus for colonialism.
The focus on whether detentions were authorized by law permitted
habeas to undo both detentions that were driven by racial subordination and
detentions that challenged racial subordination. Sometimes the government’s
exercise of custodial power sought to secure other individuals’ liberty. For
example, the government custody of fugitive-slave catchers challenged the
racist regime of slavery that was a constant threat to Black persons’ liberty.
And state and private challenges to federal officials’ plenary authority over
Native American affairs had the potential to challenge a regime of colonial
power over Natives. Yet nothing about the habeas remedy and the inquiry
into whether detentions were authorized by law could perceive that feature
of those detentions and incorporate it into the habeas process.256
255. See sources cited supra notes 243–245.
256. Cf., e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 101 (1987) (critiquing rights
frameworks on the ground that they overvalue negative liberties that can impede liberty-enhancing
government action). That habeas has a more complicated relationship to individual liberty than
might appear is related to current debates about criminal justice reform and whether criminal law
can ever be a tool for challenging subordination and achieving equality. Compare Kate Levine,
Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instinct, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 997, 1003 (2021) (“[A] project to
increase the harshness of the criminal legal system against police officers will . . . legitimize and
increase the footprint of our current criminal legal system.”), and Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning
Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2019) (“Whereas reformist efforts aim to
redress extreme abuse or dysfunction in the criminal process without further destabilizing existing
legal and social systems . . . abolitionist measures recognize justice as attainable only through a
more thorough transformation of our political, social, and economic lives.”), with Monica Bell,
Black Security and the Conundrum of Policing, JUST SECURITY (July 15, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/71418/black-security-and-the-conundrum-of-policing/
[https://
perma.cc/ZYG8-Z4JD] (“In these debates . . . there is an inevitable response from skeptics: What
about Black people’s safety? One hard truth, at least according to criminological research, is that
even as policing has been brutal and racist, it may have prevented some violence. It may have
deterred deaths.”). Scholars have also debated the role of criminal law in addressing gender
subordination. Compare Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1877 (2019)
(“[C]riminal law has [not] protected sexual privacy as clearly or as comprehensively as it should.”),
with AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S
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Instead, it ensured a legal analysis that would signal to Congress how to
expand detention schemes. Courts focused on whether detentions were
authorized by statute, which identified gaps in the detention schemes. The
structure of the analysis in habeas proceedings implied that the fix was for
Congress to authorize what were then unauthorized detentions. So, whether
courts deliberately nudged Congress to authorize detentions not yet
authorized by law, or merely conducted an analysis of whether a detention
was authorized by law, the rulings produced opinions that told Congress how
to expand detention schemes.
The cases also illustrate the importance of the law that is external to
habeas—the law that governs detentions. Even where habeas may be required
as a procedural matter, what habeas accomplishes will depend on the law
external to habeas, a concern that should be part of any reform projects aimed
at increasing the liberatory force of habeas proceedings.
Consider, by way of example, Brandon Garrett’s meticulous
disentangling of habeas cases from due process ones.257 Garrett argued that,
in the aftermath of Boumediene, the lower federal courts erroneously
conflated the scope of due process protections with the Suspension Clause,
resulting in a body of habeas case law that offered too few protections for
individuals regarding the burden of proof, the propriety of certain kinds of
evidence, or which individuals could avail themselves of habeas
proceedings.258
Garrett is correct that habeas was routinely available in instances where
individuals lacked certain individual rights and that it would be a mistake to
say that habeas is unavailable in such cases.259 He may also be correct that
the procedural rules governing habeas are more fulsome than those governing
due process.260 But it does not follow that the resulting habeas structure
would be more protective of individual rights and liberty. That would depend
on the substance of the law governing the detentions. For example, even if
habeas proceedings required a high degree of certainty about whether a
person fell within the category of persons who could be detained, that would
not supply meaningful protections if the persons who could be detained
included those suspected of associating with persons who were involved in
LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2020) (“Despite a burgeoning political consensus that the
US incarcerates too many people, uses criminal law as the solution to too many problems, and
maintains horrific prison conditions, feminists continue to champion novel penal laws and expanded
carceral regimes to address the gender issues that appear on their radars.”).
257. Garrett, supra note 7, at 54–55.
258. See id. at 54–56, 100–08, 111–19 (discussing examples of various cases that have conflated
due process protections with the Suspension Clause).
259. See id. at 54–56 (explaining that, in the context of national security detention, due process
and habeas provide separate types of protection).
260. See id. at 71–78 (arguing that habeas may offer broader protections because of its core
purpose: reviewing the basis for detention).
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some way in attacks on American authority abroad. Nor would it supply
meaningful protections if the law external to habeas allowed the government
to detain people on the basis of race or religious beliefs.
Consider another modern example related to events in the field of
immigration. The Immigrant Defense Project documented a dramatic
increase in the number of courthouse enforcement operations by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) from 2016 to 2018.261 ICE previously did
not maintain a frequent presence or carry out arrests in state courthouses, but
during the Trump administration, the federal government asserted its
intention to do so.262 Immigration advocates maintained that ICE
enforcement at courthouses made it more difficult for immigrants to rely on
law enforcement, report crimes, and access various social services.263
Reflecting these concerns, New York and other states passed laws prohibiting
ICE from arresting anyone who is going to or leaving from a court proceeding
unless the officer had a warrant signed by a judge.264
The Biden administration pulled back on the Trump-era enforcement
policy of carrying out ICE arrests at state courthouses.265 If it had not, or if a
subsequent administration were to bring back the Trump-era enforcement
policy, it is not far-fetched to imagine a federal officer being charged with
“contempt of the court” or “false imprisonment” for carrying out immigration
arrests at state courthouses.266 And if a state attempted to prosecute ICE
officers under laws designed to protect immigrants, then federal habeas
proceedings could have supplied the basis for undoing or challenging the
state arrests of ICE officers who carried out enforcement activities at state
courthouses.267 Nothing about federal habeas as it is currently structured
261. IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR COURTS: THE
IMPACT OF ICE COURTHOUSE OPERATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (2019), https://
www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Safeguarding-the-Integrity-of-Our-CourtsFinal-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/88GE-NAWP].
262. Letter from DOJ and DHS to Oregon and Washington Courts (Nov. 21, 2019), https://
www.scribd.com/document/436310694/Letter-from-DOJ-and-DHS-to-Oregon-and-Washingtoncourts [https://perma.cc/MR8R-T3JJ].
263. See IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, supra note 261, at 8 (“‘These actions jeopardize public
safety by instilling fear in immigrant communities, which makes victims and witnesses afraid to
come forward to report crimes, and unable to get justice.’” (quoting Brooklyn District Attorney Eric
Gonzalez)).
264. E.g., Protect Our Courts Act, A.2176–A, 2020 N.Y. Sess. Laws 322 (McKinney) (enacted),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/a2176 [https://perma.cc/DHU6-JZP4].
265. Mark Katkov, Biden Administration Limits Power of ICE to Arrest Immigrants in
Courthouse, NPR (Apr. 27, 2021, 10:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/27/991460979/bidenadministration-limits-power-of-ice-to-arrest-immigrants-in-courthouses [https://perma.cc/J5CVCYKL].
266. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 28.2 (McKinney 2020).
267. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (Habeas corpus is available “for an act done or omitted in pursuance
of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United
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perceives a difference between those cases and the more typical habeas case
in which an indigent defendant or wrongfully detained individual maintains
their constitutional rights were violated or they received insufficient process.
Some of the fallout from the Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v.
Oklahoma268 likewise underscores how the law external to habeas will
determine what habeas proceedings do. McGirt held that Congress had not
disestablished the Creek Reservation that was created in 1866, and that,
accordingly, the land (much of which was located in Oklahoma) remained
“Indian country” for purposes of the Major Crimes Act.269 Under the MCA,
the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by
“[a]ny Indian”; states cannot prosecute those crimes.270 After McGirt,
numerous people convicted in Oklahoma state courts filed habeas petitions
challenging their convictions.271 They were able to do so in part because of
vestiges of the idea that habeas is especially concerned about jurisdiction. An
Oklahoma appellate court held that the state courts would review errors that
went to a court’s jurisdiction, including whether the defendant or victims
were Indian, even if those claims were not raised previously.272
But whether these habeas proceedings, including habeas review for
jurisdiction, ultimately inure to the benefit of tribal sovereignty or individual
liberty will depend on what the courts say about the law external to habeas.
The Supreme Court showed some interest in one pending petition for
certiorari, staying the mandate of the state court of criminal appeals. The
petition asked the Court to jettison statements in previous cases, including
McGirt, that states lack jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country
where the victim, rather than the defendant, is an “Indian.”273 Habeas
States.”); Letter from DOJ and DHS to Oregon and Washington Courts, supra note 262 (asserting
that ICE arrests at courthouses carrying out a federal statute cannot be restricted by state rules).
268. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
269. Id. at 2453.
270. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 1151(a); McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2455–56. The Ninth Circuit held that
the United States’ jurisdiction is concurrent with that of Native American tribes. See Westsit v.
Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within
the Major Crimes Act”).
271. Application to Stay Mandate of the Okla. Ct. of Crim. Appeals Pending Rev. on Certiorari
at 12–13, Oklahoma v. Bosse, 210 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2021) (mem.) (No. 20A161) (“If Wagoner
County’s rate of post-conviction Indian Country jurisdictional claims is indicative of other Eastern
Oklahoma counties, then overall there are nearly 1,200 pending post-conviction applications raising
McGirt-related claims so far.”).
272. See id. at 9, 12–13 (characterizing an Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals opinion as
holding that “Indian country jurisdictional claims can never be waived in Oklahoma state courts”
and arguing that if not for this holding, pending habeas claims would be barred by state procedural
and equitable rules).
273. Application to Stay Mandate of the Okla. Ct. of Crim. Appeals Pending Rev. on Certiorari
supra note 271 at 15–23; see 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (extending U.S. law “as to the punishment of offenses
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States” to Indian
country).
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proceedings like these could provide the vehicle to make the sweeping
pronouncement that states possess concurrent jurisdiction over crimes on
Native lands involving Native victims. As the Chickasaw Nation argued in
an amicus brief to the Court, that ruling could substantially diminish tribes’
authority and reduce incentives for states to work with Native nations in
allocating jurisdiction.274
These examples suggest that a few factors affect what habeas
proceedings accomplish: what kinds of claims habeas proceedings are used
for, who is making those claims, and what substantive law will be used to
evaluate those claims. The idea that the nature and function of habeas
proceedings depend on these factors can yield some insights for habeas
reform proposals. For example, if the effect of habeas proceedings depends
on the kinds of claims that habeas proceedings are used for, then that is
arguably a mark in favor of “claim-splitting” reform proposals, which seek
to make habeas a forum for some criminal procedure claims but not others.275
But reform proposals should also consider some analysis of the external,
substantive law that courts would apply in evaluating the claims that may be
raised in habeas proceedings. Consider Payvand Ahdout’s recent argument
that the Supreme Court should take more cases involving “direct” collateral
review—Supreme Court review of state court post-conviction decisions.276
Ahdout maintained that her proposed restructuring would ensure that the
Supreme Court reviewed, outside of federal collateral review, state court
decisions involving constitutional claims that are raised in state collateral
proceedings—claims like ineffective assistance of trial counsel or claims that
prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory information in violation of their

274. See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief of the Chickasaw Nation at 2–3, Bosse,
210 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2021) (No. 20A161) (explaining the importance of issues of different
governments’ jurisdiction and arguing that granting a stay would negatively affect the Nation’s
cooperation with other governments to allocate jurisdiction); Brief of Amicus Curiae The
Chickasaw Nation at 23–24, 31, 34, Bosse, 210 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2021) (No. 20A161) (arguing that
federal and tribal courts have exclusive criminal jurisdiction in many cases and that granting a stay
would negatively affect the Nation’s efforts to allocate jurisdiction through intergovernmental
negotiations). The state withdrew its petition for certiorari after the Oklahoma Supreme Court
revisited a ruling relevant to the decision. Joint Stipulation to Dismiss, Bosse, 210 L. Ed. 2d 855
(2021) (No. 21-186).
275. See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 952–53 (2000) (recommending that Congress allow federal
habeas review for “claims [that] are so vital to assuring fundamentally fair criminal proceedings
that they must be reheard on federal habeas notwithstanding the prior opportunity to litigate them
in the state courts”); Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“[F]ederal habeas review of state criminal convictions should focus on whether
there is a systemic state violation of criminal defendants’ rights. A systemic violation exists when a
state actor (or set of actors) violates defendants’ rights repeatedly, such that there is a pattern of
violations across multiple cases.”).
276. Z. Payvand Ahdout, Direct Collateral Review, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 164–66 (2021).
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obligations under Brady v. Maryland.277 But whether that additional habeas
review does much good for individual liberty and constitutional criminal
procedure rights will depend on what the Court would say about the
substance of those criminal procedure guarantees.278 Expanding or
contracting the availability of habeas review is only part of the story, since
there is reason to question whether the Court’s pronouncements on the scope
of constitutional criminal procedure rights would cohere with habeas
expansionists’ ideals.
3. Status Quo Bias.—The habeas remedy also has built in a status quo
bias that makes it somewhat difficult to use the remedy to challenge a broader
system—in the case studies, a legal regime that was permeated by race and
colonialism. The habeas remedy allows for a singular challenge: an
individual seeking their freedom. That individualistic orientation provides for
a single clean shot, which may be an awkward fit for more systemic
challenges but works well for error correction.279 And that has made habeas
a natural way to push back against individuals and entities who challenge a
larger system—and a more difficult mechanism for individuals who
challenge the system as a whole to use.
Consider how state and federal habeas functioned in Native American
affairs. There, habeas courts zeroed in on resolving the status of particular
lands, invoking customary practices—how state, local, tribal, and federal
governments acted with respect to certain lands or groups of persons.280
Habeas formalized existing norms and hardened them into concrete law.
Habeas courts supplied more formal justifications for state and federal
assertions of authority over Native persons and Native lands—assertions the
government regularly acted on, albeit without the kind of legal theories
spelled out in the habeas cases.281

277. Id. at 187–93.
278. See Application to Stay Mandate of the Okla. Ct. of Crim. Appeals Pending Rev. on
Certiorari, supra note 271 at 1–2, 11–13, 15 (explaining that Oklahoma courts have been allowing
postconviction challenges under McGirt and showing prisoners’ habeas petitions depend on the
Court’s decisions on whether jurisdictional procedural limitations were waived and whether states
have jurisdiction over these crimes).
279. Eve Primus has proposed some reforms to habeas to make it better suited to address
systemic reforms. Primus, supra note 270, at 5–7. Primus has also identified some doctrinal features
of habeas that ask more systemic questions, although there the remedy is still individualized. Eve
Brensike Primus, Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions: A Structural Approach to
Adequacy Doctrine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 75, 79–81 (2017).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658, 663, 665 (W.D. Ark. 1885) (assessing whether
land was a reservation by sorting out conflicting customs and use).
281. People have rightfully criticized this theory on the ground that it works like “might makes
right.” See, e.g., Elizabeth Reese, Welcome to the Maze: Race, Justice, and Jurisdiction in McGirt
v. Oklahoma, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/
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Or consider the area of immigration, where, as Lucy Salyer and Beth
Lew-Williams have documented, habeas proceedings freed a significant
number of individuals and allowed them to enter or remain in the United
States.282 Salyer estimates just over 1,500 people in a roughly 15-year period
entered or remained in the United States because of habeas proceedings.283
While that was an important result of the habeas proceedings, such
proceedings did not constrain the emergent immigration regime.284 Instead,
the regime continued to expand and sweep in more persons, even as habeas
remained available for error correction,285 and even though habeas was, for a
limited time, effective against new, emerging immigration restrictions.
Habeas did, however, push back against individuals and entities who
challenged it, such as when habeas proceedings freed fugitive-slave catchers
from state criminal process. The state criminal proceedings for fugitive-slave
catchers were direct challenges to the legal regime of slavery and the slave
trade on which it depended.286 There, the habeas remedy provided a
meaningful challenge to the few aberrational cases where state criminal
processes were brought to bear on individuals participating in the legal
regime of slavery.
The contrast between these different kinds of habeas proceedings
highlights how there were some features peculiar to the immigration system
at the beginning of the end of the nineteenth century that make
generalizations about the effect of habeas more difficult. The immigration
habeas scheme at the time was operating in the context of a wholly new and
dramatically understaffed and underfunded emergent immigration regime.287
Habeas courts reviewing immigration cases supplied an existing apparatus to
2020/08/13/mcgirt-reese/ [https://perma.cc/NZ9B-FDSD] (discussing the McGirt Court’s rejection
of the “Indian character” test, which was based on previous state jurisdiction or treatment of Native
Americans).
282. See SALYER, supra note 49, at 80, 82 (indicating that high percentages of Chinese habeas
corpus cases resulted in the petitioner being allowed to enter the United States); LEW-WILLIAMS,
supra note 115, at 208–09 (indicating low rejection rates of Chinese migrants arriving in the United
States).
283. See SALYER, supra note 49, at 80, 82 (indicating the percentages of Chinese habeas corpus
cases that were resolved by discharge or dismissal and the total number of cases for 1891–1905 in
the district court and circuit court).
284. See LAU, supra note 192, at 28 (“Although in the long run these challenges proved
fruitless, they nevertheless provided, in the short term, one means of avoiding exclusion, and they
served as stop-gap measures to slow enforcement.”).
285. See LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 193 (arguing that the plenary power doctrine used
to justify Chinese exclusion was used to “sift, select, or bar all aliens at America’s gates” and to
expand “a racially based immigration regime in the twentieth century”).
286. See supra notes 136–141.
287. See SALYER, supra note 49, at 40 (“The division of responsibilities among . . . offices
tended to lead to a diffused, uncoordinated administration of the laws . . . .”); id. at 57 (pointing to
“shortage of funds” as an explanation for executive branch policymaking); id. at 69 (“[T]he judges
were, in a sense, captured by law.”).
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administer the immigration scheme in part because there was no ready supply
of federal or state immigration officers to reliably carry out the new
immigration restrictions.288 The novelty of the immigration regime—the fact
that it was not yet a unified, sweeping, sprawling system—coupled with the
fact that executive officers were ill-equipped to carry it out contributed to the
successful outcomes in individual immigration habeas cases.
Some have suggested that habeas courts were more favorably inclined
to immigrants than executive officers because of cultural or institutional
attributes that courts possess, such as rule of law ideals.289 Indeed, Salyer
argued that “[t]he fact that the case came before the court on a writ of habeas
corpus had special significance” in the courts’ comparative receptiveness to
Chinese immigrants in these cases.290
Yet in performing their law-declaring functions, courts were often more
indulgent of expansive powers over immigration and Native American affairs
than their counterparts in other branches. In both immigration and Native
American affairs, the federal government initially argued for more limited
theories of government power than what courts ultimately supplied. In the
Chinese Exclusion case, Chae Chan Ping, the federal government attempted
to tie its authority to enact the Chinese Exclusion Act to certain enumerated
powers, including the power to regulate foreign commerce, the power to
establish uniform rules of naturalization, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause.291 But the Court embraced a more capacious theory of the
government’s power, holding that the federal government could exclude
foreigners as an incident of sovereignty in order to protect its very
sovereignty.292 In the case involving the Major Crimes Act, for example, the
federal government argued that the source of Congress’s power was one of
its enumerated powers, the Indian Commerce Clause.293 The federal
government argued that the clause allowed the United States to legislate
“intercourse” with Native Americans and that the power to create criminal
laws to regulate Native Americans was incidental to that power and therefore
288. See id. at xv (“[T]he Bureau of Immigration did not emerge from its authorizing
statute . . . fully developed with the power . . . that would later distinguish it . . . .”).
289. See id. at xvi (“[T]he federal judges were also constrained by their perception of their
institutional obligations. In the immigration cases, the federal judges often felt bound by the rules
and norms of the court that called for hearing and weighing evidence in individual cases according
to standard judicial practice . . . .”).
290. Id. at 72, 75.
291. Brief for the United States at 5, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(No. 1446). The government also pointed to Article I, section 9, which prohibits “[t]he migration or
importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit” before
1808 as evidence that Congress did have the authority to exclude foreigners. See id. (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1).
292. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
293. Brief for the United States at 5, 14, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)
(No. 1246) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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within the scope of Congress’s powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.294 Specifically, the government asserted, “If [Native Americans] are
permitted to murder each other, it is certainly an interference with
intercourse; because the number with whom intercourse will be held is
thereby diminished.”295 The Court, however, rejected the suggestion that
Congress’s powers derived from or were limited by the Indian Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.296 Instead, the Court
maintained, the powers were an incident of sovereignty derived from the
doctrine of discovery: because the United States had conquered the lands and
the people, it assumed full power over them.297 And because the powers
derived from conquest and sovereignty, they were plenary, unlimited, and
subject to minimal review.
The case studies also challenge the idea that courts may have been
especially liberty-protective because they were bound by a requirement of
reason giving.298 This theory of legitimacy is not unique to courts; more
recently, it has appeared in scholarship responding to fears about the
administrative state.299 The idea here is that reason giving—providing
explanations for decisions—is a meaningful constraint on government
power. In the specific context of habeas, the idea is that courts’ judicialopinion-writing responsibilities restrain them from doing things that the
political branches can do without explanation.
But the reason-giving requirement did not really distinguish habeas
courts from the lawmaking branches, as a comparison of the reasoning in the
cases upholding exercises of power with the reasoning of the legislators
illustrates. When Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act, Senator
Sherman stated, “current sentiment in this country [is] that we should prohibit
races so distinct, so alien, so different in habits, civilization, religion, and
character from ours, from coming to our country.”300 When President
Cleveland signed the Act, he stated that Chinese migrants had “purposes
unlike our own and wholly disconnected with American citizenship.”301 The
Court’s screeds in Chae Chan Ping sounded in a similar register. The Court
294. Id. at 4–6 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 18).
295. Id. at 24.
296. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79.
297. See id. at 379–80 (arguing that Congress can govern Native Americans because the United
States owns the territories and has sovereignty over the land and people within the United States’
borders).
298. See SALYER, supra note 49, at xviii–xix, 69 (suggesting that federal courts were more
receptive to Chinese individuals challenging Chinese-exclusion laws because of courts’ institutional
norms and judges’ sense of being bound by the law).
299. See generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeuele, The Morality of Administrative
Law, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2014).
300. LEW-WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 186–87.
301. Id. at 188.
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linked the federal government’s power to exclude immigrants to the idea that
“the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not
assimilate with us” could “be dangerous to its peace and security.”302 The
Court’s reasoning drew from the racial ideologies that motivated the
detention schemes themselves.303
The same occurred in the area of Native American affairs. The
legislative history of the Major Crimes Act evinces congressional
representatives’ concern with “civilizing the Indian race,” and “teach[ing]
them regard for the law, and show[ing] them that they are not only
responsible to the law, but amendable to its penalties.”304 The legislative
history is also rife with expressions of concern about relying on tribal
governance systems to address crimes by tribal members: “[I]t will hardly do
to leave the punishment of the crime of murder to a tribunal that exists only
by the consent of the Indians of the reservation . . . punished according to the
old Indian custom.”305 Again the Court’s reasoning sounded in a similar
register. Ex parte Crow Dog depicted Natives as “aliens and strangers . . .
separated by race” who led a “savage life” and pursued “red man’s
revenge.”306
Lucy Salyer’s historical analysis of the emerging immigration
restrictions, and in particular her data about the unpublished district-court
decisions granting writs in immigration habeas cases, is an important part of
why the upshot of these case studies is not the abolition or general restriction
of the writ.307 But the several thousand immigration habeas cases decided
between 1891 and 1905 were not adjudicated by the courts as such; instead,
the district court that decided most of these cases outsourced the adjudication
302. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). Justice Field, who authored
the opinion in Chae Chan Ping, took virulently anti-Chinese immigration positions as a presidential
hopeful in the 1880 and 1884 elections; he described the question as “whether the civilization of
this coast, its society morals, and industry, shall be of American or Asiatic type,” CARL B. SWISHER,
STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 221 (1969), and his campaign argued for the need to
protect American institutions from “the oriental gangrene.” PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD:
SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 205 (1997).
303. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595 (explaining the motivation behind immigration
restrictions was that people “saw, in the facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions of
China, where population presses upon the means of subsistence, great danger that at no distant day
that portion of our country would be overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict
their immigration”); id. (“In December, 1878, the convention which framed the present constitution
of California . . . took this subject up” and set forth, “in substance, that the presence of Chinese
laborers had a baneful effect upon the material interests of the state, and upon public morals; that
their immigration was in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a
menace to our civilization.”); see also Chin, supra note 123, at 7 (“[T]he Court held that a returning
resident non-citizen could be excluded if Congress determined that his race was undesirable . . . .”).
304. 16 CONG. REC. 934 (1885) (statement of Rep. Cutcheon).
305. Id. at 935 (statement of Rep. Cutcheon).
306. 109 U.S. 557, 571 (1883).
307. See supra notes 287–290.
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of Chinese immigration habeas petitions to a single commissioner who
handled all of these cases during that time period.308 The commissioner did
not decide cases in accordance with “the customary trial procedures and rules
of evidence”—the institutional and legal rules that are supposed to guide
courts.309 But the commissioner still recommended overturning immigration
officers’ decisions; the courts signed off on his decisions.310 So it was not
federal judges or the habeas process as such that drove these results.
Courts may have felt bound by norms requiring them to supply reasons
or couch those reasons in a particular register. But that did not generate a
body of law that was more protective of individual rights or liberty than what
emerged in the political branches at the time.
***
In some of these cases, habeas was one of several possible vehicles or
bases for jurisdiction that might have ultimately generated similar governing
legal principles. Even so, that is a useful rejoinder to the myth of the great
writ and the idea that there is anything unique about the writ, at least with
respect to its capacity or potential to do harm or protect individual liberty.
Habeas proceedings were also the natural vehicle to test the exercise of
the government’s powers in these areas, which encompassed sweeping
assertions of detention authority. That is, habeas, almost by necessity, will be
the vehicle to challenge these kinds of excesses of government power and
abusive exercises of detention authority. And as this subpart explained, there
were features unique to habeas that enabled the remedy to lay the groundwork
for expansive government powers and to become a part of the toolkit for
American colonialism. Understanding those features provides a more
accurate picture of the writ.
B.

Remedies and Power
The case studies illuminate how habeas, in addition to, or sometimes
instead of, safeguarding individual liberty, also helped to legitimate
government power. The case studies illustrate how the process of judicial
legitimation works, which also exposes some of the costs of the myth of the

308. SALYER, supra note 49, at 77.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 81 (“Heacock’s recommendations carried great weight in the final disposition of the
case because the judge routinely confirmed his decision.”); see id. at 77 (“To free themselves to
attend to the other business of the court, the judges referred the Chinese cases to a United States
commissioner . . . .”).
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great writ.311 The myth of the great writ helped to make habeas a mechanism
for legitimating government power.
Remedies are often thought of as checks on government power,312 and
judicial remedies in particular are thought to be essential to restraining the
government and protecting individual liberty.313 But judicial remedies,
including habeas, can also enhance government power by conferring
authority on the government. This process, known as judicial legitimation,
was part of Charles Black’s original defense of judicial review.314 Black
argued that courts’ power to invalidate laws gave them the politically useful
ability to validate government policies.315 The habeas case studies shed light
on specific examples of how the process of judicial legitimation works,
including how it works through the myth itself.
Other scholars of judicial legitimation suggested that legitimation works
by discouraging protest and channeling it into judicial fora.316 Habeas courts

311. Cf. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 7 (1980) (“In
the United States, the writ continues as the ‘symbol and guardian of individual liberty.’ As such, a
liberal judicial attitude has been considered appropriate in its administration.”).
312. E.g., Richard H. Fallon Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (“The second, more absolute principle
demands a general structure of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government within the
bounds of law.”); id. at 1778–79 (“Another principle, whose focus is more structural, demands a
system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government generally within the bounds of
law.”).
313. E.g., Tyler, supra note 3, at 386 (“The judiciary is the sole branch constituted for the very
purpose of ensuring that individual rights are not improperly displaced by a political majority merely
for the sake of expediency.”); see also, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in
Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 741 (2011) (describing remedies
as “adequate to keep government within the bounds of law”); Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence
and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1477, 1478–79 (2018) (“[S]cholars . . . have focused on how the
availability of legal remedies determines the efficacy of legal rights.”); Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2466, 2471 (1996) (discussing the public’s belief in “the role of the courts in constraining police
power”); Sunita Patel, Jumping Hurdles to Sue Police, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2257, 2260 (2020)
(discussing the use of structural reform litigation to change “the policies or practices of a
governmental entity”).
314. CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY
59 (1960); cf. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293–94 (1957) (arguing that the Court has a “unique legitimacy
attributed to its interpretations of the constitution” that allows it to make national policy, a power
constrained by political forces in ways that make the Court less inclined to act against lawmaking
majorities).
315. BLACK, supra note 314, at 66–67 (arguing that “the power to validate is necessarily the
power to invalidate” and that “the legitimating function of the Supreme Court is one of immense . . .
importance to the nation”).
316. See A. JAVIER TREVINO, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES 216 (2017) (“People do not revolt, because of the effects of the legitimation process
begun by legal institutions.”); T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34–35 (1935) (“[T]he
function of law is not so much to guide society, as to comfort it . . . . From a practical point of view
it is the greatest instrument of social stability . . . .”).

1LITMAN.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

274

12/21/2021 6:34 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 100:219

sometimes channeled this idea in decisions interpreting the scope of the writ:
Courts granted access to the writ in part because they envisioned that habeas
was preferable to extrajudicial methods for challenging government
policies.317 Some scholars have further argued that courts confer legitimacy
on government policies through legal reasoning that draws on
“interpretations of the Constitution”318 or through popular physical symbols,
such as the black robes judges wear or the concept of blind justice.319 These
mechanisms were also on display in habeas cases. Habeas proceedings lent
authority to the detentions by supplying reasons and justifications for them,
reasons and justifications often grounded in political theories about the
Constitution.
But the case studies also reveal three additional ways in which habeas
specifically conferred authority on government policies. Understanding these
mechanisms expands existing accounts about how legitimation might work:
• Habeas courts traded in on the myth of the great writ—the idea
that the writ is an important bulwark of individual liberty—to
legitimate abusive government practices that were challenged in
habeas proceedings;
• Habeas courts freed persons who carried out government power
and private individuals who exercised state-sanctioned
hierarchical authority over others; and
• Habeas courts carried out detention schemes by implementing
them.
These three mechanisms are unique to habeas in some respects. That is,
habeas possesses some particular features that did facilitate habeas acting as
a means to legitimate government power. Only in habeas proceedings would

317. United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 697 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879)
(No. 14,891) (“It may be that the Indians think it wiser and better, in the end, to resort to this peaceful
process than it would be to undertake the hopeless task of redressing their own alleged wrongs by
force of arms.”).
318. Dahl, supra note 314, at 293–94. Alan Freeman argued that the Court’s equal protection
doctrine legitimates existing patterns of racial subordination because it holds out a promise of
liberation even when it does not deliver on its promise. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978).
319. See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the
European Union: Models of Institutional Support, 89 AM. POL. SCI. R. 356, 372 (1995) (“[B]efore
the [European] Court [of Justice] acquires an ideological identity, it probably has the ability to rely
on traditional judicial symbols to communicate with its various constituencies.”); J.D. Ura, Backlash
and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110,
113 (2014) (suggesting that that symbolic representations of the courts’ authority allow the courts
to declare that government policies are “worthy of . . . respect, deference, and obedience” (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme
Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. R. 59, 61
(2008))).
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the myth of the great writ provide courts with the cachet to bless abusive
practices (though courts could uphold the practices for other reasons). And it
is because habeas is an anti-detention, decarceral remedy that habeas could
free government officials and people exercising state-sanctioned power and
carry out detention schemes by determining whether someone should be
detained.
1. Myth and Narrative.—Habeas courts leveraged the myth of the great
writ to bolster courts’ authority to bless government practices. Habeas courts
traded in on the idea that habeas is an important bulwark against government
overreach to legitimate government power—sometimes by using faith in
habeas as a way to downplay fears about government overreach.320 Consider
this statement by Henry Hart, the original co-author of the field-defining
federal courts casebook, who argued that in the area of immigration, “[T]he
very existence of a jurisdiction in habeas corpus . . . implied a regime of
law.”321 Other times, courts borrowed from the myth of habeas to provide
credibility for courts’ determinations that detentions were lawful and
legitimate.
Still other times, courts invoked the myth of the great writ to justify less
typical usages of the writ that furthered colonialism or racial subordination.
Take United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, which concerned a slave
owner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.322 The petition asserted that
another individual had (wrongfully) freed the owner’s slaves.323 To explain
why “the writ has issued at the instance of third persons”—here, the slave
owner—rather than the detainee,324 the court offered a lengthy history
extolling the importance of “the great writ of personal liberty”325: “The writ
of habeas corpus is of immemorial antiquity”; it “ha[s] been consecrated for
ages in the affectionate memories of the people as their safeguard against
oppression”; “[t]here is no writ so important for good.”326
Part of what made the writ “so important for good,” the court explained,
was that it was “so little liable to be abused” since “[a]t the worst, in the hands
of a corrupt or ignorant judge, it may release some one [sic] from restraint
320. E.g., United States v. Chin Lin, 187 F. 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1911) (explaining that if the
detainee did “not have a fair hearing the writ of habeas corpus” would follow); Gee Fook Sing v.
United States, 49 F. 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1892) (“[A]ny person alleging himself to be a citizen of the
United States . . . and who on that ground applies to any United States court for a writ of habeas
corpus, is entitled to have a hearing and a judicial determination.”).
321. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390 (1953).
322. 28 F. Cas. 686, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 16,726).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 694.
325. Id. at 689.
326. Id. at 688–89.
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who should justly have remained bound.”327 “But,” the court emphasized, “it
deprives no one of freedom.”328 That is the essence of the myth of the great
writ—the idea that habeas is, at best, a device to secure important personal
liberties, and, at worst, a process that does no harm. Here, the reasoning was
used to justify a slave owner’s ability to file a writ of habeas in order to secure
the possession of his slaves who had attempted to escape with the assistance
of another.
The court went on to invoke the writ’s usage to free slaves as a reason
why the writ also extended to slave-owners: “Freemen or bondsmen, they
had rights; and the foremost of these was the right to have their other rights
adjudicated openly and by the tribunals of the land. And this right at least,
Mr. Wheeler [the alleged slave owner] shared with them.”329 After deploying
the myth of the great writ to justify the court’s authority, the court upheld the
writ issued to the slave-owner and declined to consider an application filed
by one of the people alleged to be his slave—a person who said she had
escaped from slavery.330
There are myriad examples of courts trading in on the myth of habeas
to legitimate abusive applications of the writ. Courts invoked “obedience to
the writ of habeas corpus” as grounds to free fugitive-slave catchers.331
Courts leveraged the idea of the “great writ of right, known as the writ of
habeas corpus” as a basis to determine the status of Native lands.332 They
gestured toward the important office of the writ, ascertaining power and
jurisdiction, as a reason why habeas courts could “look into the case” and
determine whether an individual was properly categorized as Native
American.333 As a prelude to upholding draconian immigration restrictions
and withholding constitutional protections from noncitizens who were
outside the physical borders of the United States, courts pointed to the writ
as a reason not to fear emerging restrictive immigration laws: “An alien
immigrant . . . is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain

327. Id. at 689.
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. Id.; see also id. (“I was called upon to issue the writ of habeas corpus, at the instance of a
negro, who had been arrested as a fugitive from labor.”). Along similar lines (though different
outcomes), United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879)
(No. 14,891), concluded that Native Americans could file habeas petitions just as whites could do
because the term person “is comprehensive enough, it would seem, to include even an Indian.” Id.
at 697; see also id. at 695 (stating that Native Americans are the “remnants of a once numerous and
powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered and generally despised race”).
330. Wheeler, 28 F. Cas. at 694–95.
331. Ex parte Robinson (Robinson II), 20 F. Cas. 965, 968 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856) (No. 11,934);
see also Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445, 449 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7,259) (describing “a habeas
corpus to rescue” an individual).
332. United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658, 663 (W.D. Ark. 1885).
333. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 354–55 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878).
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whether the restriction is lawful.”334 The writ gave courts additional purchase
and credibility to uphold abusive exercises of government power.
The Court’s infamous decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania invoked the
significance of the writ as grounds to justify Congress’s power to enact the
Fugitive Slave Acts.335 After rattling off a litany of constitutionally protected
activity (making treaties, prohibiting the arrest of congress persons during
congressional sessions), Prigg posed this question: “May not congress
enforce this right, by authorizing a writ of habeas corpus. . . .?”336 Prigg then
invoked both the constitutional status and importance of the writ.337 From
there, the Court deduced that Congress could create habeas protections for
persons carrying out activities contemplated by the Constitution (here, the
capture and return of fugitive slaves) even though the Constitution did not
explicitly grant Congress such power.338 Congress also specifically gestured
toward the writ as a counterweight to abusive government practices.
Section 5 of the Chinese Exclusion Act specifically provided for habeas
corpus as an oversight mechanism for the new immigration restrictions.339
The myth of the great writ gave courts and lawmakers some cover to
legitimate abusive exercises of government power, including using the writ
to further the American colonial project.
The phenomenon of habeas courts invoking the myth of the great writ
to affirm government policies arguably reflects Charles Black’s theory that
courts could use their power to invalidate government actions—here,
specifically via the great writ of liberty—to validate government actions. But
the usages of the myth differ from Black’s understanding about how
legitimation would work because in these examples the story itself, rather
than courts’ brute authority to invalidate government actions, provided some
measure of legitimation. And courts used the myth of the great writ not only
to validate government policies and practices, but also to justify their power
to invalidate other practices such as state prosecutions of fugitive-slave
catchers or the attempted rescue of enslaved persons.
334. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); see also Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 543, 546–47 (1895) (stating that if an “alien is entitled of right, by
some law or treaty, to enter this country, . . . their illegal action, if it results in restraining the alien
of his liberty, presents a judicial question, for the decision of which the courts may intervene upon
a writ of habeas corpus”).
335. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 619–20 (1842) (“[I]t would be difficult to say,
since this great writ of liberty is usually provided for by the ordinary functions of legislation, . . . it
ought not to be deemed, by necessary implication, within the scope of the legislative power of
congress.”).
336. Id. at 619.
337. Id. at 619–20.
338. Id.
339. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 60 § 5, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (repealed 1943); cf. Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 725 (1893) (describing the writ of habeas corpus under section 5 as
applying to Chinese persons who have been denied the privilege of immigration).
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While the myth of the great writ is arguably a symbol like judicial robes
or blind justice, it is a different kind of symbol—a narrative, rather than a
visual image. And it differs from the kind of legal reasoning that scholars
argued would be a mechanism for legitimation. The myth of the great writ
was not a legitimating force because it seemed obscure or impenetrable, and
therefore somehow above or different from ordinary politics. The myth
supplied legitimacy through a story that everyone could understand. Equally
important, the power of the myth did not depend on people reading the court
opinions: While judicial opinions drew on the myth, the myth could be
transmitted and propagated through a simple idea rather than through legalese
or impenetrable reasoning.340 Even if no one other than judges, practicing
lawyers, and political elites in the lawmaking branches read the opinions
invoking the myth, the myth still served an important function. It helped
legitimate the legal processes of colonialism and slavery in the eyes of the
people who carried it out. The myth allowed lawyers and political elites to
talk about their work in exalted terms and to rationalize their actions—or
perhaps even convince themselves that they were part of a storied tradition
that was worthy of respect and admiration.
These usages of the myth underscore how the stories that courts and
lawyers tell have real power and can provide government with authority. The
use of narrative is most often associated with critical race theory, which uses
the method of narrative to incorporate the experiences of historically
excluded groups into the law and to expose contradictions and hierarchies in
the law.341 But here, narrative was deployed as a tool of the state—to
construct government power.342 And these examples underscore the danger
of incomplete, oversimplified, or sanitized histories of the law: The myth of
the great writ became a tool to justify and obscure racial subordination and

340. See David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIS.
L. REV. 790, 843 (suggesting that “modern constitutional scholars” recognize “[t]he symbolic
quality of Supreme Court adjudication” as fact, as a justification for judicial review). But see id.
(arguing that the public has “sufficient knowledge about neither the Court’s actions nor its function
to meet the conditions necessary in an operationalized definition of legitimization”).
341. See, e.g., Eleanor Marie Brown, The Tower of Babel: Bridging the Divide Between Critical
Race Theory and “Mainstream” Civil Rights Scholarship, 105 YALE L.J. 513, 514 (1995) (“Critical
race theorists’ use of narrative epitomizes this attempt to include voices ‘from the bottom.’”); Nancy
Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795, 797 (1999)
(“Equally abhorrent to traditionalists are the narrative methods some critical theorists use to
illustrate their arguments.”).
342. Cf. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice
of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803,
812–13 (1994) (noting that not all critical theory is narrative, and that narrative is a methodological
form of “scholarship that Euro-American males have cited for generations”).
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colonialism—a device for lawyers and elites to connect what they were doing
to a nobler story rather than to reality.343
2. Brute Force.—Habeas courts facilitated legitimation in other ways as
well. While the literature on legitimation has focused mostly on symbols,
reasoning, and courts’ power to invalidate laws, habeas proceedings also
provided real force behind the government’s policies.
Habeas was a legal mechanism for cementing government authority by
freeing persons who exercised federal authority. In the fugitive-slave habeas
cases, habeas immunized fugitive-slave catchers from state criminal process.
Habeas also supplied affirmative authorization to take people into slavery
and to protect oneself from future criminal process. And in Native Americanaffairs cases, habeas was a way to free individuals who served as Indian
officers and carried out federal authority over Native lands. Habeas could
perform these functions because it is a decarceral remedy that frees people
from detention, a feature that has a more complicated, contingent relationship
to liberty than might appear.344
Habeas also provided a way to implement government policies—to
distinguish between different groups and sort individuals along the lines that
Congress had established.345 Habeas courts regularized the process of sorting
between the racial groups that Congress had sought to detain and the groups
that Congress left free. In that respect, habeas courts performed a similar
function to the customs officers who screened persons for exclusion from the
United States.346 The habeas proceedings were folded into the detention
schemes. Habeas performed that function because it is an anti-detention
remedy, which is the natural vehicle to challenge but also implement the
detention schemes.

343. The fact that habeas courts leveraged the myth of the great writ to justify American
colonialism and racial subordination is also another example of the dilemma or double bind that
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw identified in early work on critical race theory—namely, that by
invoking flawed legal processes and flawed institutions, victims of racial subordination may end up
reifying and legitimating them. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1366–69
(1988) (“People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they
are challenging.”).
344. As Ex parte Sifford, 22 F. Cas. 105 (S.D. Ohio 1857) (No. 12,848), one of the cases freeing
fugitive-slave catchers, explained, “it seems admirably suited to effect the rescue of any prisoner in
the custody of an officer.” Id. at 106, 109, 112.
345. See SALYER, supra note 49, at 18 (“[T]he federal courts in San Francisco . . . took a
surprisingly active role in administering the [Chinese Exclusion Act].”).
346. Some courts complained how habeas proceedings were duplicative of administrative
processes. See Lee Sing Far v. United States, 94 F. 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1899) (discussing how,
following a district court’s decision judgment in a habeas proceeding arising out of the Chinese
Exclusion Act, a new attorney would often join the case and request a rehearing on the basis that
the former attorney failed to note an exception to the report of the referee).
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***
With these mechanisms in mind, it is possible to better assess the myth
of habeas, which depicted habeas as a “Great Writ” because it protected
individual liberty. The case studies raise questions about all three
components of a myth that purports to explain why and how habeas protects
individual liberty. Indeed, the case studies even raise questions about holding
out the elements of the myth as unadulterated goods.
First, habeas was an unreliable way of correcting unlawful detentions
for at least two reasons. The idea that habeas corrected for jurisdictional
errors allowed habeas courts to create a set of rules about what made a
detention lawful. That set of rules did not result in courts assessing whether
all of the statutory preconditions for detention were satisfied. Instead, courts
focused on certain preconditions—those regarding race, citizenship, and
place. If a precondition did not affect a court’s jurisdiction, then a detention
would still be unlawful, but habeas would not supply a remedy.
Habeas arguably fared even worse at addressing unjust detentions and
unjust laws. Habeas rarely supplied a basis for successfully challenging
statutes on the grounds that they exceeded the government’s authority,
authorized detentions for invalid reasons, or violated individual rights. The
challenges that were successful did not meaningfully constrain abusive
exercises of government authority. Habeas also had a more complicated
relationship with individual liberty than the myth suggests. While habeas did
secure detained individuals’ liberty, that sometimes came at the expense of
other people’s liberty. Securing an individual’s liberty from detention did not
necessarily bring about justice, and sometimes habeas was a way of asserting
custody or authority over people who may have otherwise enjoyed greater
liberty in the absence of the writ.
Even if the myth is merely a loose approximation or a stand-in for some
set of abstract principles, such as the idea that people shouldn’t be detained
without sufficient cause, the gap between the principle and the process that
implements it is notable. Understanding the gap and jettisoning the idea that
habeas, at worst, imperfectly effectuates those principles are particularly
important because the association between habeas and lofty principles such
as safeguarding against wrongful detentions gave some purchase to less
salutary usages of the writ. And it continues to provide a way to ignore the
more complicated history of habeas by abstracting it away into irrelevance
and to avoid developing a more precise account about what habeas should be
used for.
In some respects, the story of habeas in the nineteenth century United
States parallels Paul Halliday’s history of the common law writ in England
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between 1500 and 1800.347 In Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire,
Halliday surveyed English habeas practice during the sixteenth, seventeenth,
and eighteenth centuries by examining every writ issued every few years
between 1502 and 1798.348 Rejecting “Whig” histories of the writ that
“dr[e]w lines through certain events . . . to modern liberty,”349 Halliday’s
work suggests that, during this time period, the writ functioned more as an
instrument of increasing judicial power than as a way to protect individual
liberty.350 The writ helped the King’s Bench preserve its authority relative to
other courts and later its authority relative to Parliament and the King.351 The
nature and function of the writ “arose not from ideas about liberty, but from
sovereignty.”352 In other words, habeas was an instrument for seizing and
building power and control, not solely for constraining it.353
That is also one function the writ performed in the law of slavery and
freedom, Native American affairs, and immigration. While some aspects of
habeas lent themselves to that project, it would be a mistake to draw a single
straight line between Halliday’s history of the English common law writ and
the 19th century usages of the writ and generate some grand theory of habeas.
In particular, the case studies reveal how central racial ideologies were to the
operation of habeas in the nineteenth-century United States, and they clarify
the stakes of getting a more complete and complex picture of habeas.
Conclusion
In some ways the case studies presented in this Article call to mind the
debates that surfaced in the aftermath of Boumediene. Seven years after the
first detainees arrived at Guantanamo Bay, Boumediene held that the
constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus extended to them while they were
detained at the U.S. military base there.354 Yet almost a decade and a half
after Boumediene, there remain nearly forty people detained at the United
347. See generally HALLIDAY, supra note 31.
348. Id. at 319–33 (describing the methods and basic findings for survey of all uses of the writ
of habeas corpus from the court of King’s Bench every few years between 1502 and 1798).
349. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 11 (1931); see Michael
E. Parrish, Friedman’s Law, 112 YALE L.J. 925, 954–55 (2003) (reviewing BUTTERFIELD, supra
note 349) (discussing Butterfield’s writings on “Whig” history). Steve Vladeck’s review of Halliday
described Halliday’s work as “methodologically driven historical revisionism” that rejected “the
story of habeas corpus in England [which] ‘ha[d] been written less as a history than as an exercise
in legal narcissism.’” Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941,
943, 945 (2011) (quoting BUTTERFIELD, supra note 349, at 14).
350. Vladeck, supra note 249, at 945.
351. Id.
352. HALLIDAY, supra note 31, at 7.
353. Cf. DUKER, supra note 21, at 62 (“Habeas corpus originated as a device for compelling
appearance before the King’s judicial instrumentalities. It is easy to conceive of the writ as a process
that could be used by a repressive government to divest an individual of personal freedom.”).
354. 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
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States military base on Guantanamo Bay.355 Over half of the individuals
released from Guantanamo Bay never filed a habeas petition,356 and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has developed myriad rules that make
it easy for the government to win habeas cases arising from Guantanamo
Bay.357
As a result, some scholars have questioned whether Boumediene was a
real win for constraining government power and safeguarding individual
liberty.358 Some have openly wondered whether the availability of habeas
was a net negative—in part because the availability of habeas may have
blunted popular or political challenges to the detentions by providing them
with a veneer of legitimacy and constraint.359
This reality, together with the case studies, suggests it may sometimes
be worth asking whether habeas proceedings do more harm than good—even
where the harms may be difficult to quantify, and even where the harms may
seem more abstract relative to the possibility of releasing actual persons from
detention.
We should not expect habeas to be a cure-all for expansive detentions
or sweeping exercises of government power. But neither does that suggest
that we should get rid of the writ altogether.360 The case studies focused on
less sanguine uses of the writ—how habeas was part of the legal apparatus
for racial subordination and American colonialism. But what was true about
the myth of the great writ is also true about the case studies; they are not the

355. The Guantánamo Docket: Detainees at the Prison at Guantánamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees [https://
perma.cc/4RQE-FMYR].
356. Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 559, 564, 592–93
(2017).
357. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 7, at 56, 93, 100, 103, 108−10 (criticizing some of these
doctrines and decisions); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Unreviewable Executive: Kiyemba, Maqaleh, and
the Obama Administration, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 603, 615–16 (2010) (discussing how D.C. circuit
court cases have found in favor of the Obama Administration’s arguments against allowing habeas
relief for Guantanamo detainees).
358. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 551, 551, 616–18.
359. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 386 (“[T]he resulting
habeas jurisdiction has had at best a complex, largely indirect, effect on detention policy. In the end,
the impact of habeas is far more ambiguous than either critics or supporters of Boumediene have
recognized.”); id. at 430 (“[T]he federal courts have done just enough to deflate significant social
mobilization in favor of further releases. Boumediene celebrates legality but without furnishing any
constraining law. At the time of this writing, the received wisdom in policy circles calls for fresh
legislative involvement in detention issues.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantánamo, 48
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (2011) (noting how pro-government law developing in Guantanamo
cases has spilled into other areas).
360. See generally, e.g., NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011).
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only or the entire story of habeas. Habeas is not just a device for oppression,
just as it is not only a device for liberation. The reality is more complicated.
That is partially why the case studies do not justify the wholesale
elimination of habeas (consistent with whatever the Constitution requires) or
more draconian restrictions on the writ. While this project has brought to light
some of the costs of habeas, weighing those costs against the benefits may
involve weighing factors that are both inextricably related to and not easily
measured against one another. For example, one cost of habeas was its role
in legitimating the detention schemes by providing a veneer of legality.
Another cost was how it implemented detention schemes by sorting between
persons. But those costs are also inextricably linked with a key benefit of
habeas—identifying (some) of the people who were erroneously detained.
Comparing systemic costs with individualized benefits is difficult, and there
are not obvious answers as to how that comparison cuts in the case studies.
That is particularly true in the area of immigration, where work by Lucy
Salyer and Beth Lew-Williams showed that, in the immediate rise of
restrictive immigration laws during the late nineteenth century, habeas did
function as an important mechanism for identifying erroneous detentions
where a statute was wrongfully applied to some people.361 But it is difficult
to generalize about habeas from those case studies given the consensus that
habeas was a poor way for correcting erroneous detentions in other areas,
such as Native American affairs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries,362 and an unreliable way of correcting erroneous detentions within
the law of slavery and freedom. In that area, habeas provided a vehicle for
carrying out erroneous detentions in some cases.
Rather than justifying abolition of the writ or restrictions on the general
availability of the writ, the upshot of this project is to begin to address the
problem of erasure that results from oversimplified legal tropes about the law
and derives from sanitized legal histories about particular legal processes. It
suggests that more complete stories are needed to answer questions such as
when and under what conditions legal processes deliver on their promises,
and to better understand the promises and limits of legal processes like
habeas.
One partial but important coping mechanism would be to stop indulging
in the myth of habeas as the great writ of liberty. As the case studies
suggested, the myth itself and the aura around habeas served as a device to
excuse abusive exercises of government power. Equally important, the myth
of the great writ is an act of erasure—it omits the stories of the persons who

361. See supra notes 282–283 and accompanying text.
362. See HARRING, supra note 185, at 133 (explaining that only one other person was released
in light of the ruling in the Crow Dog case).
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bore the negative consequences of the writ and the writ’s role in racial
subordination and colonialism.
Abandoning the myth of habeas could also help us conduct more
accurate constitutional analyses of habeas. Existing legal frameworks err
when they assume that habeas is solely a mechanism for protecting individual
liberty.363 Boumediene developed a test for the scope of the Suspension
Clause that assumed the core purpose of habeas was to guard against the risk
of erroneous detentions.364 Department of Homeland Security v.
Thuraissigiam365 applied that test by assuming that habeas proceedings could
“overwhelm[]” and “augment the burdens” on the government.366 That
framework, however, tells only half the story because habeas proceedings
also benefit the government by solidifying and augmenting its powers.
At bottom, we should stop referring to habeas as the great writ of liberty
because habeas is not necessarily great or even good. The functions habeas
performs depend in part on who is invoking the writ, for what end, and what
the law external to habeas is. Rather than trading in on a myth that imperfectly
captures the history of the writ, habeas should be judged based on what it
actually does—and invoking the myth allows us to avoid crafting an account
about what habeas should do.

363. See HALLIDAY, supra note 31, at 4 (“[I]f lawyers and judges want to act on claims about
history, we must first make a fully contextualized reclamation of those past principles. Only then
might history serve law . . . .”).
364. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745, 766, 779 (2008).
365. 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
366. Id. at 1966−67.

